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A HAMBURG CHILDHOOD: THE EARLY
LIFE OF HERBERT BERNSTEIN
PAUL H. HAAGEN*
On the evening of April 19, 2001, Herbert Bernstein’s wife, Wal-
traud, decided to watch Schindler’s List, and she invited Herbert to
join her.  That evening, her mind was very much on the past, because
the following day would be the anniversary of Hitler’s birthday.1
Herbert told her that he could not, that he had too much work to do.
The following day he had to teach his final two classes of the term,
and he still had to do last minute revisions on the manuscript of the
book he was writing with Joseph Lookofsky, the second edition of
Understanding the CISG in Europe.  As the evening wore on, how-
ever, the lure of the movie and of the chance to spend the evening
with Waltraud proved too strong and he left his study to join her.
The movie, which is powerful enough for audiences with little connec-
tion to that time and place,2 deeply moved Herbert, who had strong
ties of memory with both.  He slept very fitfully that night.3
No one who encountered him the next morning would have had
any sense of the burden of that past on him.  I suspect that none of his
colleagues were aware that it was Hitler’s birthday.  If there were
those who were, theirs would have been an intellectual or political
awareness, not a personal one.  Unlike Herbert, they had not lived
Copyright © 2003 by Paul H. Haagen.
         * Professor of Law, Duke University.  I would like to thank Waltraud Bernstein, who gave
me invaluable assistance with this essay, Professor Deborah DeMott who urged me to write it,
and Professor Ralf Michaels for his bibliographic assistance. The Dean and Faculty of Law at
the Johannes Kepler Universität in Linz, Austria, where I was Visiting Professor, provided the
facilities and quiet to enable me to bring it to completion.
1. Adolf Hitler was born in Braunau-am-Inn in Austria on April 20, 1889. IAN KERSHAW,
HITLER, 1889-1936: HUBRIS 10-11 (1999) [hereinafter KERSHAW, HUBRIS].  After Hitler came
to power, it became the most important holiday in the Nazi calendar, and an opportunity to dis-
play “the might and power of the Third Reich.”  Id. at 184-85 (describing the extraordinarily
elaborate displays orchestrated by Goebbels in connection with Hitler’s fiftieth birthday in
1939).
2. See, e.g., Tim Dirks, Review of Schindler’s List, The Greatest Films, at http://
www.filmsite.org/schi.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
3. Except where otherwise noted, the sources of personal information about Herbert
Bernstein are either from him directly or from members of his immediate family.
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through those celebrations.  Herbert was not likely to have said any-
thing about it.  He spoke to me that morning about the end of the
term, and the imminent sending-off of his manuscript.  He told me
that he was looking forward to being with me and my family in Hong
Kong that summer.  He joked and exchanged pleasantries with the
staff and other colleagues.  It was not his habit to burden others with
the burden of his past.4
My personal awareness of his early life came relatively late in our
fifteen-year relationship.  I knew that Herbert Bernstein was a man of
great erudition and deep humanity.  He was funny, irreverent, and in-
satiably curious about nearly everything.  As to the few topics that did
not interest him, he managed to show considerable interest in the
question of why he was not interested.  Herbert carried himself with
the easy intellectual grace and sophistication of someone who had
been to the academic manor born.  I assumed that he had been.  In
recent years, I discovered in bits and pieces that the reality of his up-
bringing was very different.  His early life was one characterized by
deprivation and disruption that would have crushed many and left
those uncrushed cynical, embittered, and suspicious.  These experi-
ences seem to have produced the opposite effect in him.  They deep-
ened his tolerance for others and his commitment to make those parts
of the world that he touched more decent and humane.
When Herbert had a massive heart attack and died in the Law
School shortly before noon on April 20, 2001, the Dean asked me to
write a short piece about him on behalf of the Law School for release
to the press.  What I wrote concentrated heavily on what he had told
me about the experiences of his early life.5  My remarks at his memo-
rial service several days later were even more directed at those expe-
4. I suspect that some of his reluctance to speak about his experiences during the Third
Reich reflected the uneasiness of a survivor.  He was keenly aware that others, including others
in his own family, had suffered more than he had and had not survived.  This awareness comes
through strongly in the unfinished essay that he was working on at the time of his death, re-
flecting on his experiences with the Nuremberg Laws.  See Herbert L. Bernstein, Reflections on
the Nuremberg Laws,  (incomplete and unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Envi-
ronmental Law and Policy Forum) [hereinafter Bernstein, Reflections]. Herbert began working
on this project several years before his death.  He regarded it as an important coming to grips
with his experience of Nazi Germany, but clearly found it difficult to work on and did not bring
it to completion.  I am grateful to his widow Waltraud Bernstein for allowing me access to the
manuscript.
5. Press Release, Duke University School of Law, Duke Law Professor Herbert Bernstein
Dies at Age 71 (April 20, 2001) available at http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/Law/bernstei.htm
(essentially the same press release the author prepared).
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riences.6  In putting together this volume, Professor Deborah DeMott
asked me to expand those remarks into a paper.  This essay is the re-
sult.  I have attempted to stitch together various stories that Herbert
had told me over the course of our friendship7 and to put them into
some sort of historical context.  It is a narrative of his boyhood in
Hamburg during the worst years in that city’s history.  It is a remark-
able tale of survival, and of the struggle of one boy to be allowed to
create his own identity.
HAMBURG
Herbert Bernstein was born in Hamburg, Germany on January
12, 1930.  It was not the most auspicious of times and places to make
an appearance in the world.  Hamburg is a city of great beauty, with a
long and proud history.  But in January, it is cold and grey.  The tem-
perature hovers around freezing, and the damp that rolls in off the
North Atlantic hangs stubbornly over the city.8  In January 1930, the
cold greyness of the weather mirrored a much more ominous cold
greyness in the economic and political situation of Germany in gen-
eral and of Hamburg in particular.  For those inclined to read the
heavens, there was something especially troublesome in the fact that
the god of the underworld made his presence known to man only a
month after Herbert’s birth.9
6. Paul H. Haagen, Remarks at the Duke University School of Law Memorial Service for
Herbert Bernstein (April 25, 2001), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/bernstein/haagen.
html.
7. Personal memories of events that took place more than a half century ago are often
very unreliable as historical sources.  Events get conflated and stories embellished.  So many of
the documents relating directly to the events in Herbert Bernstein’s life have fallen victim to the
chaos he survived, or have otherwise been inaccessible to me in doing the research for this pa-
per, that it is impossible to document his stories with precision.  That said, I have been struck by
the fact that nothing that Herbert Bernstein told me has turned out to be implausible or in con-
flict with any of the general histories of the period.  It appears to me that in his memories of his
own life, he maintained the same fidelity to truth and accuracy that he displayed in his scholar-
ship.
8. For an account of the experience of the cold of a Hamburg winter, see MATHILDE
WOLFF-MÖNCKEBERG, ON THE OTHER SIDE, TO MY CHILDREN: FROM GERMANY 1940-1945
at 30-35 (Ruth Evans ed. and trans., Mayflower Books) (1979).
9. Clyde Tombaugh, working at the Lowell Observatory in Flagstaff, Arizona, discovered
the ninth planet, on February 18, 1930.  The existence of the planet, which was then named after
the god of the underworld, Pluto, had been hypothesized for years.  See Clyde W. Tombaugh,
The Struggles to Find the Ninth Planet, NASA/JPL Outer Planets/Solar Probe Project, at
http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/ice_fire//9thplant.htm(last modified Dec. 5, 2000); Clyde W. Tombaugh,
The Discovery of a Solar System Body Apparently Trans-Neptunian, Lowell Observatory, Ob-
servation Circular, available at http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/ice_fire/s_dscvry.jpg.
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Hamburg had been, for much of its history, a prosperous Han-
sastadt, proud of its independence.10  In the middle of the nineteenth
century, it began to take on a very different form and role in the
world, the change driven in large part by trade with the English
speaking world.11  As late as 1850, Hamburg was still relatively small,
with only fifty thousand inhabitants.  By the end of the century, the
old Hansastadt had been transformed into a thriving international en-
trepôt of one million inhabitants.  By the first decade of the twentieth
century, it had become the second largest city in the Reich, the largest
port on the Continent of Europe, and Germany’s second largest in-
dustrial center.12  Hamburg continued to grow following the First
World War, despite repeated economic crises and political upheaval.
Its population reached 1,236,000 in the year Herbert was born, and
then increased an additional forty-one per cent over the first nine
years of his life.13
In the context of that time and place, Hamburg was a liberal and
progressive city.14  It was a place in which Jews15 found a large meas-
10. Hamburg lost a significant part of that independence in 1871, when it was absorbed in
the German Reich.  Weltmachttaumel und Wahlrechtskämpfe [World Power Frenzy and the
Struggle for Voting Rights], Museum für Hamburgische Geschichte [Hamburg Museum], at
http://www.hamburgmuseum.de/d/htm_d/textversion/20jhd-1-01.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
Today, it is the second smallest of the sixteen German Länder, and its pride in its past is ex-
pressed in its official name, The Free and Hanseatic City (Freie und Hansestadt) of Hamburg.
Hamburg in a Nutshell, at http://www.hamburg.de/fhh/international/englisch/hamburg_kurz.htm
(last visited Oct. 4, 2002).  See WOLFF-MÖNCKEBERG, supra note 8, at 16.
11. Some of this growth was achieved by incorporating surrounding communities.  See
Hamburg City History, at http://www.hamburg.de/fhh/international/englisch/geschichte_ ham-
burgs_2.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).  It was one of the most important ports of embarkation
for European emigrants to North America and Australia.  Between 1850 and 1934, five million
of such emigrants passed through the port of Hamburg.  Hamburg and the English Speaking
World, at http://www.hamburg.de/fhh/international/englisch/index.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
12. Groß-Hamburg [Greater Hamburg], Museum für Hamburgische Geschichte [Hamburg
Museum], at http://www.hamburgmuseum.de/d/htm_d/textversion/20jhd-1-08.html (last visited
Oct. 4, 2002).  It was either the third or fourth largest port in the world. THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, HAMBURG FIELD REPORT 2 (1947) [hereinafter HAMBURG
FIELD REPORT].  But cf. MARTIN CAIDIN, THE NIGHT HAMBURG DIED 13 (1966).
13. Welthafen und Wirtschaftsmetropole [World Port and Commercial Metropolis], Museum
für Hamburgische Geschichte [Hamburg Museum], at http://www.hamburgmuseum.de/d/htm_d/
textversion/20jhd-1-04.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
14. See KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 287 (describing Hamburg as Germany’s most
liberal city).  When Hitler came to address the Hamburger Nationalklub on February 28, 1926,
he recognized that anti-Semitic race baiting would be counter-productive with his Hamburg
audience.  In his two-hour speech, he did not make a single reference to Jews.  Id. at 286.  See
also WOLFF-MÖNCKEBERG, supra note 8, at 16.
15. In trying to conduct a census of the number of Jews in Hamburg, the leaders of the
Jewish community faced the awkward problem of whom to include.  This proved to be almost as
difficult a determination for them to make in determining who should be included in their
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ure of toleration and acceptance.  Jews found so much acceptance as
individuals, and had such easy social interaction with the larger soci-
ety of Hamburg, in fact, that the leaders of the Jewish community
feared that its members would lose their distinct identity.  In re-
sponse, they developed the “Hamburg system,” which attempted to
preserve Jewish rituals and practices by reaching out to non-religious
Jews.16  Their problem of maintaining Jewish identity was not, how-
ever, merely a matter of meeting the challenge of secularization and
acculturation.  They also had to contend with very high rates of mar-
riage outside the community.  About half of all Jews in Hamburg who
married between 1925 and 1933 married non-Jews.17  The response of
the Jewish leaders of Hamburg to this development was more di-
vided.  The Hamburg Temple Association attempted to embrace the
non-Jewish spouse and worked to integrate him or her into the Jewish
community.  The Hamburg Synagogue Association tried to discour-
age the practice of marrying outside the community by refusing
membership to non-Jewish spouses.18
The city’s liberal and progressive traditions were seriously chal-
lenged in the fifteen years before Herbert’s birth by economic and
political turmoil that created serious hardship for its inhabitants.  Ul-
timately, they failed the challenge.  The British naval blockade during
the First World War effectively closed the port to international traffic
and produced massive shortages of food and fuel.  By 1917, rations
provided for only a thousand calories a day, half of the average calo-
rie intake before the war.  In the country as a whole, it is estimated
that three quarters of a million people died of malnutrition.19  Priva-
tion was then followed by military defeat, and military defeat by the
community, as it would in the much more insidious decisions made by the Nazis about whom to
exclude from theirs.  The Jewish community’s census in 1926 came up with a figure of just under
21,000, a number that did not include the acculturated, non-practicing Jews, whom the Nazis
later would add in their broader Rassejuden definition.  Only about half of those included in the
Jewish community survey had been born in Hamburg.  Dr. Ina S. Lorenz, The Deutsch-
Israelitische Gemeinde/German-Israelite Community in the Weimar Republic, in A HISTORY OF
JEWS IN HAMBURG (Struan Robertson, trans.) at http://rrz.unihamburg.de/rz3a035/
jew_history3.html (last modified Oct. 2, 2000).
16. See id.  (referring to the practice as “consciously accept[ing] insidious acculturation”).
17. Id. This calculation obviously involves all of the definitional problems associated with
determining who counted as a Jew.
18. Id.  Herbert’s father was a secular, not a religious person.  Whether this debate was of
interest at the time to him and to his German wife is not at all clear.
19. KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 99.  On conditions in Hamburg during the war, see
Lebensverhältnisse im Kaiserreich [Conditions of Life in the Empire], Museum für
Hamburgische Geschichte [Hamburg Museum], at http://www.hamburgmuseum.de/d/htm_d/
textversion/20jhd-1-02.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
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imposition of the punitive terms of the Treaty of Versailles.  Those
terms included, among other things, the confiscation of virtually the
entire merchant fleet of Hamburg.20  The shipping industry was the
center of Hamburg’s economy.21  Crippling it crippled the whole
economy.  The confiscation was followed by the devastating effects of
hyperinflation during 1922-1923.22
Patrician inhabitants of Hamburg remained confident in the
strength and uniqueness of their traditions, and dismissive of radicals
like the “common little house painter from Austria.”23  But the re-
peated upheavals of the period 1915 to 1930 took their toll and cre-
ated conditions in which complacent confidence proved misplaced.
The city’s prosperity had become, for most of its population, only a
dim memory, and its vaunted independence was fading under the im-
pact of economic trends that it could not control.  As Hamburg’s
economy slipped into Depression in 1929-30, the formerly unrespon-
sive ground of Hamburg became increasingly fertile territory for po-
litical extremists.24  The Nazis placed second in the city elections in
1931, barely behind the first-place Social Democrats.25  They did even
better the following year, getting 31.2 per cent of the Hamburg vote
in the April national elections and finishing first.
Immediately before that election, Hitler flew into Hamburg to
address a cheering crowd of more than 120,000 on April 23, 1932.26
Luise Solmitz, a Hamburg schoolteacher, recorded her thoughts after
witnessing the event:
How many look to him in touching faith as the helper, saviour, the
redeemer from great distress. To him, who rescues the Prussian
prince, the scholar, the clergyman, the peasant, the worker, the un-
employed out of the party into the people.27
Herbert Bernstein was two years old.
20. The Peace Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, Part VIII: Reparations, Annex III, sec-
tions 1-9, available at http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/versa7.html.
21. There were ninety-seven miles of docks to serve the vessels.  HAMBURG FIELD
REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.  At the start of the war, there were more than 3,000 industrial es-
tablishments and 5,000 commercial firms, the vast majority of which were connected directly or
indirectly to the shipping industry.
22. See BERND WIDDIG, CULTURE AND INFLATION IN WEIMAR GERMANY (2001).
23. See WOLFF-MÖNCKEBERG, supra note 8, at 16.
24. On the very active response of the Hamburg Jewish community to the threat posed by
the Nazi party, see Lorenz, supra note 15.
25. KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 355.
26. Id. at 364-65.
27. Id. at 364.
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THE NAZIS COME TO POWER
Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany on January 30,
1933.  There was little doubt that his appointment was going to be bad
for German Jews.  His, and his Party’s, hostility to Jews was open and
the rhetoric that he directed against them violent.  The only questions
were how bad, for how long, and who in the Jewish community would
be affected the most.  There was always the hope that once in office
Hitler would be more responsible than he had been as an outsider
agitating to get in, or that he would be outmaneuvered by more expe-
rienced politicians in less radical parties.  There was always the hope
that the next election would produce different results, and that the
Nazis would be turned out of government.  The next three months
went a long way toward extinguishing any realistic grounds for hope.
Following the Reichstag fire on February 27, the Party moved to
consolidate its power in a swift and brutal fashion.28  Hitler persuaded
President Hindenburg to sign an emergency decree on February 28,
1933 that suspended most of the guarantees of personal freedom con-
tained in the German Constitution in order to permit the government
to defend itself against “communist acts of violence endangering the
state.”29  The Nazis then proceeded to arrest and imprison tens of
thousands of their political opponents in a reign of terror that the
peasant leader Georg Heim called worse than that of the Commu-
nists.30  In the state governments that the Nazis did not control di-
rectly, they pressured local officials to put Nazis in control of the po-
lice, and purge those officers whom they regarded as unreliable.31
The government in Hamburg readily complied with their demands.32
With much of the leadership of the Left under arrest, Hitler then ca-
joled and bullied the Reichstag into passing the notorious Enabling
Act – “Law for the Removal of the Distress of People and Reich” – in
28. Id. at 456-63.
29. Verordnung des Reichspräsident zum Schutz von Volk und Staat [Decree of the
Reich's President on the Protection of the People and the State] v.28.2.1933 (RGB1.I S.83),
available at http://www.documentarchiv.de/ns.html.  Hindenburg acted pursuant to Article 48 of
the German Constitution of August 11, 1919, which provided for the suspension of the Constitu-
tion in times of emergency.  The decree was never withdrawn.  See id.
30. KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 463.
31. Id.
32. In Hamburg, ten per cent of commissioned police officers and two per cent of non-
commissioned officers were dismissed for political reasons in 1933 as part of this purge.  See
Hamburg Police Battalions during the Second World War, in A HISTORY OF JEWS IN HAMBURG
(Struan Robertson, trans.), at http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/rz3a035/police101.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 4, 2002).
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the early evening of March 23, 1933.33  Articles I and II of that Act
gave authority to the Reich Cabinet to enact laws outside the normal
provisions of the Constitution.  By this act of legislation, the Nazis
created the framework for the legal lawlessness that would charac-
terize the regime.34
Nazi Party activists had long engaged in various forms of street
level intimidation and thuggery with little direction from any central
leadership and without regard for law of any type.  When the Party
assumed the reins of power, the levels of this violence, much of it di-
rected at Jews, increased markedly.  Radicals in the Party, dissatisfied
with what could be accomplished by the acts of individual initiative,
demanded a more coordinated approach in the form of a national
boycott of Jewish-owned businesses.35  Jews outside of Germany, in
response to the growing levels of violence and discrimination directed
at Jews inside the Reich, attempted with some success to organize a
boycott of German goods.36  Hitler reacted to this initiative, as he
would to most opposition, by angrily striking back.  In this case, Hit-
ler sided with radicals in the Party against his Foreign Minister, Kon-
stantin Neurath, and the President of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar
Schacht, by agreeing to a one-day boycott of Jewish businesses to
take place on April 1, 1933.  The actual event, organized and enforced
by the Sturmabteilung,37 was far from universally successful.  Many
non-Jews refused to be intimidated by the Brownshirts and defied the
boycott.  If largely unsuccessful in economic terms, it effectively
33. Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich [Law for the Removal of the
Distress of People and Reich], v.23.3.1933 (RGB1.I S.173), available at http://www.document
archiv.de/ns.html.
34. The final act in this particularly macabre play was the Gesetz gegen die Neubildung
von Parteien [Statute against the Formation of Parties], v.14.7.1933 (RGB1.I S. 479), available at
http://www.documentarchiv.de/ns.html.  Enacted on July 14, 1933, the statute declared in section
one that the National Socialist Party was the sole political party in Germany, and in section two
outlawed the formation of any new ones.  Id.  Since other parties ceased to exist, the Reichstag
could be used to rubberstamp legislation if it seemed expedient to bother.  It seldom did.  Be-
tween 1933 and the beginning of the war in 1939, the Reichstag met only sixteen times and
passed nine statutes.  Operating under the special powers created under the Enabling Act, the
Reich Cabinet promulgated approximately four thousand five hundred laws.  Bernstein,
Reflections, supra note 4, at 9.
35. Many of these attacks were carried out by the Fighting League of the Commercial
Middle Class [Kampfbund des gewerblichen Mittelstands], who were able to give expression to
their hatred of both Jews and the frequently Jewish owned department stores in a single act of
violence.  See KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 471-72.
36. Id. at 472-73.
37. Dr. Ina S. Lorenz, The Deutsch-Israelitische Gemeinde/German-Israelite Community in
the Weimar Republic, in A HISTORY OF JEWS IN HAMBURG (Struan Robertson, trans.), at
http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/rz3a035/jew_history4.html (last updated Oct. 2, 2000).
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traumatized many in the Jewish community, who realized how much
and how quickly they had become strangers in their own country.38
The boycott was, moreover, just the beginning.  It set the stage
for a flurry of discriminatory statutes and decrees that both had an
immediate harmful impact on Jews in Germany, and constituted a
powerful demonstration of their vulnerability in the new Nazi state.
The first piece of legislation, the “Law for the Reestablishment of a
Professional Civil Service,” was enacted on April 7, just six days after
the boycott.39  This law, with certain exceptions for those who had
served at the front in the First World War, or lost sons or fathers in
that war,40 provided explicitly for the forced retirement of all “non-
Aryan” civil servants at all levels of government.41  In the context of
the German State, “civil servants” was a very broad category of per-
sons that included teachers and professors, as well as bureaucrats.
But the reach of the legislation was even farther than that broad cate-
gory might suggest.42  The statute itself explicitly authorized the na-
tional bank and rail system to adopt regulations to carry out the pur-
poses of the law.  Private employers who were not covered explicitly
were strongly encouraged to take actions consistent with it, and some
of the largest ones complied.43  On April 22, 1933, Jewish doctors
were relegated to private practice, “deregistered” from the public
health service.44  Three days later the Nazis enacted the Statute
against Overcrowding of German Schools and Universities, limiting
the number of non-Aryans permitted to attend school to the percent-
age of non-Aryans in German population.45  Jewish students in Ham-
38. KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 474.
39. Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtums [Law for the Reestablishment of a
Professional Civil Service], v.7.4.1933 (RGB1.I S.175), available at http://www.documentarchiv.
de/ns.html.
40. The exceptions did not represent the views of the Nazi leadership.  They had been in-
serted at the insistence of President Hindenburg.  KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 474.
41. Four days after the enactment of the law, the Nazis issued a clarifying order defining
non-Aryan as including persons with at least one Jewish grandparent.  See Bernstein, Reflec-
tions, supra note 4, at 8.
42. A year later, it was extended to reach members of the military.  Id. at 18.
43. The “spirit of the law” was extended to private businesses and organizations as well
through intense pressure from the Party.  In April 1933, Gustav Krupp agreed to dismiss the
Jewish employees of his vast commercial empire, and to remove Jews from all representative
positions in industry and commerce organizations.  KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 448.
According to Professor Lorenz, these dismissals were illegal under German law.  Lorenz, supra
note 37.  It seems likely that Krupp, and others who gave into this pressure, were unconcerned
that their actions might result in a finding of liability.
44. Lorenz, Die Deutsch-Israelitsche Gemeinde, supra note 37.
45. Gesetz gegen die Überfüllung deutscher Schulen und Hochschulen [Statute on the
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burg reported that individuals understood the enactment of this law
to encourage and authorize various acts of discrimination and har-
assment directed at them.46
The Professional Civil Service Act did not contain any definition
of “non-Aryan.”  This was a matter that the Nazis neither had worked
out before they seized power, nor to which they had a uniform an-
swer.  The imprecision did not significantly affect the Aryan students,
who now felt free to persecute their classmates, or Brownshirts en-
gaged in street-level thuggery.  Neither the local Nazi activists, nor
most of the Party leadership, was overly concerned with the problem
of false positives in these cases of harassment.47  The use of law to
carry out the program of discrimination and economic isolation, how-
ever, required some sort of workable definition.
Four days after the passage of the legislation purging the civil
service, the Nazis issued a clarifying decree defining anyone who had
one Jewish grandparent as non-Aryan.48  This definition was then ex-
plicitly incorporated by reference in the “Statute against Overcrowd-
ing of German Schools and Universities.”  That statute contained a
further elaboration to deal with the children of certain special classes
of persons: the children of especially meritorious veterans and those
whose parents had been married before the date of the statute.  They
were exempted from the category of non-Aryan if one parent and two
grandparents were Aryan.49
Herbert’s uncles, Kurt and Herbert, did not wait long to see
whether this wave of hostility would pass and the earlier pattern of
acceptance of Jews in Hamburg society would re-assert itself.  Kurt
Overcrowding of German Schools and Universities], v.25.4.1933 (RGB1.I S. 225).
46. Lorenz, supra note 37.  According to Hans Thielemann, soon after the passage of this
legislation, anti-Semitic rhetoric began to “permeate” his grammar school and class in Berlin.
Hans Thielemann, Memoirs of a Luftwaffe Nachtrichten Veteran, Feldgrau.com, at http://
www.feldgrau.com/interview4.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
47. There were those like Hjalmar Schacht, who were opposed to street violence as dan-
gerous, wasteful, and often counter-productive.  Although generally inclined to want to keep the
radicals in check, he did not demonstrate strong concern about who was affected by discrimina-
tory legislation against Jews.  KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 473-74, 564-65.
48. Erste Verordnung zur Durchführung des Gesetzes zur Wiederherstellung des
Berufsbeamtentums [First Regulation Implementing the Law for the Reestablishment of a Pro-
fessional Civil Service] v.11.4.1933 (RGB1.I S.195).
49. Gesetz gegen die Überfüllung deutscher Schulen und Hochschulen [Statute on the
Overcrowding of German Schools and Universities] v.25.4.1933 (RGB1.I S. 225), available at
http://www.documentarchiv.de/ns.html.  Herbert Bernstein, who had one Jewish grandparent,
and whose parents were married before the promulgation of the law, was thus in the class of
persons exempted from the restrictions imposed in the school law, even though he came within
the definition of non-Aryan.
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emigrated to Brazil, Herbert to the United States.  They were part of
an initial wave of emigration from Hamburg that reduced the size of
its Jewish community by a quarter within two years of the Nazis
coming to power.50  How his uncle Herbert, the youngest of Leopold
Bernstein’s four children, managed to get one of the precious 25,957
quota spots allocated annually by the U.S. government to immigrants
from the German Reich,51 Herbert did not know.  They were ex-
tremely hard to obtain.
Leopold Bernstein did not want to leave.  He wanted to stay.  Al-
though he was a Jew,52 he expected his military service in the First
World War to give him some measure of protection, and there was
reason in the initial wave of anti-Jewish legislation to believe that it
might.  Certain categories of veterans, such as those who had fought
at the front in the First World War, and the family members of those
who had lost fathers or sons in the war, were exempted from the
forced retirement provisions of the civil service law, and their chil-
dren were not included among those subject to the school quota law.
His service in the Kaiser’s army did not, however, protect him. He
was dismissed from his job in 1933, because he was non-Aryan.
That act of discrimination was not, however, enough to convince
him to leave the only world he knew, and the part of his family that
still remained in Hamburg.  He, like many others in the Hamburg
Jewish community, hoped to figure out some way to accommodate
himself to the new realities of life under the Nazis.53  When he finally
decided in 1937 that there was no place for him in the Third Reich, he
was unable to get one of the precious American immigration spots
and join his son Herbert in the United States.  He left instead to join
Kurt in Brazil.  After he had been unemployed for four years, he was
too poor to bring any of his other relatives, not even his wife, along
with him.54
50. Lorenz, supra note 37.
51. Willi Paul Adams, The German Americans, available at: http://www.lib.iupui.edu/
kade/adams/chap1.html.  The quota established in 1929 was filled every year.  It was not
adjusted until after the war.
52. It has never been clear to me whether Leopold Bernstein maintained his connections
with the Jewish community and with Jewish religious practice, and thus would have been con-
sidered a Jew by the Jewish community.  There is no doubt that employing the “racial” defini-
tions used by the Nazis, he was a Jew.
53. Ina Lorenz notes that after the initial shock of the events of April, 1933, many Jews in
the Hamburg community experienced the period from 1933 to 1937 as one of comparative calm,
and hoped that it would be possible to work out an accommodation with the Nazi regime.
Lorenz, supra note 37.
54. His departure was part of a second wave of emigrations from Hamburg that followed
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HERBERT’S PARENTS
Although Herbert strongly identified himself with Hamburg, nei-
ther of his parents had been born there and both were relatively re-
cent immigrants to the city.  He believed that his ancestors were from
the east, probably Poland, although neither he, nor apparently any-
one else, was quite sure.  His paternal grandfather, Leopold Bern-
stein, had been born in the fortress city of Spandau, which would later
become part of Berlin.  By 1905, Leopold had moved his family to the
town of Cloetze in the Altmark region of Saxony Anhalt, where Her-
bert’s father, Gerhard, was born.55  Sometime later he continued his
westward trek, and moved his growing family to Hamburg.  Herbert’s
maternal family, the Franzes, were from the port city of Kiel.56  Nei-
ther of his parents was educated.57 
Even in the worst of times, some of the lucky members of society
are able to insulate themselves, at least to some degree, from the im-
pact of economic downturn and political change.58  Herbert’s family
could not.  They had neither the wealth, nor connections to do so.
Gerhard Bernstein was a working man.  He labored, when he could
get work, as a skilled pipefitter in Hamburg’s shipping industry.  He
was not yet twenty-five when Herbert was born.
the enactment of the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, and further reduced the size of the Hamburg
Jewish community to fewer than 40% of the number at the time Hitler was appointed Chancel-
lor.  The Jewish community in Hamburg attempted to aid those trying to emigrate, but the im-
pact of economic discrimination and continued emigration reduced the resources of the com-
munity so substantially that such assistance was increasingly limited.  By 1939, according to an
official Nazi census, there were only 8,438 practicing Jews, 1,505 “Rassenjuden”, and 4,187
“Mischlinge 2. Grade” left in the city.  Id.
55. For background on the town of Cloetze, see Cloetze, Officially Recognized Holiday
Resort [Stadt Klőtze, Staatlich anerkannte Erholungsort] at http://www.stadt-kloetze.de.
56. Kiel is a port on the western Baltic an hour north of Hamburg.  Like Hamburg, Kiel
had been part of the Hanseatic League, entering into the alliance in 1284.  It was, however, far
less successful in maintaining its independence.  From the late eighteenth century, it was part of
the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein.  The Kingdom of Denmark asserted control over it in the mid-
nineteenth.  Following the short Prusso-Danish War of 1864 and the even shorter Prusso-
Austrian War of 1866, it was ceded, along with the most of the rest of Schleswig-Holstein, to
Prussia. Kiel was the site of the great German naval mutiny in November 1918.
57. According to Herbert, his mother’s older sister had not had any advanced education.
The family, therefore, regarded it as improper for the younger sister to have any.
58. For an account of the experience of the war years by a relatively privileged Hamburg
family, see WOLFF-MÖNCKEBERG, supra note 8.  The wife of the Professor of English Language
and Literature at Hamburg University, and the daughter of a former Lord Mayor of Hamburg,
“Tilli” expressed great concern in her diary at the news that Germany had invaded Holland and
Belgium.  In an effort to cheer herself up, she attended a performance of Johann Strauss’s oper-
etta Wiener Blut, which she noted was “gay and cheerful.”  Id. at 35-36.  Such distractions were
out of the reach of the Bernsteins both before and during the war.
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At the time Gerhard Bernstein was entering the workforce, there
were at least faint signs for the first time in a decade, that things might
finally be starting to get better for the workers of Hamburg.  Its econ-
omy, closely tied to those of Great Britain and the United States, re-
covered sooner and grew substantially faster than those of other
German cities.  With economic growth, workers’ wages began to rise.
By 1927, those wages had recovered to their pre-war levels.  It must
have been at least a cautiously hopeful time after the nightmare of the
previous decade and a half.59
Those hopes were soon dashed. Between the time that Herbert
was conceived and the time he was born, the economic situation in
Hamburg deteriorated badly.  The Depression, which began in Ham-
burg in late 1929, a few months before Herbert’s birth, hit the entire
German economy hard.  It proved particularly traumatic for the
young.60  Industrial production fell by forty-two per cent,61 and it is es-
timated that almost half of all German workers were either fully or
partially unemployed.62  The German government showed no sign
that it had any idea what to do in the face of this pervasive and deep-
ening crisis that radicalized much of the population, and disoriented
and disillusioned even more of it.63
Hamburg, which had so conspicuously benefited in the 1920s
from its economic ties to the Atlantic world, now just as conspicu-
ously suffered as a result of them.  During the time between Herbert’s
birth in 1930 and his second birthday in 1932, unemployment in
Hamburg reached nearly forty per cent.64  In the ship building indus-
try where his father worked, the situation must have been even worse.
Gerhard Bernstein was among those who lost their jobs.  It seems
likely that his layoff, which happened before the Nazis came to
power, was not racially motivated.  He was, along with tens of thou-
sands of other Hamburg workers, merely another victim of bad eco-
nomic times.
Germany’s economy began to recover soon after the Nazis seized
power in January 1933, but the recovery in Hamburg was notably
59. Im Jahrzehnt der Wirtschaftskrisen [In the Decade of the Economic Crisis], Museum für
Hamburgische Geschichte [Hamburg Museum], at http://www.hamburgmuseum.de/d/htm_d/
textversion/20jhd-1-07.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
60. KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 407-08 (citing the rise in youth suicide and crimi-
nality).
61. Id. at 404.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 405-07.
64. Im Jahrzehnt der Wirtschaftskrisen, supra note 59.
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more sluggish.  Unemployment in the city remained stubbornly high,
and substantially worse than that in other large German cities.65  This
higher unemployment rate was attributable, in large measure, to the
economic policies pursued by the Nazis during their first three years
in power.  Those policies sought to build up German industrial ca-
pacity by restricting imports, and had a serious negative impact on
Hamburg’s international trade driven economy.
The ship building industry, and with it the larger economy of
Hamburg, did not fully recover until the Nazis began their massive
program of rearmament in 1936.66  When the recovery came, Gerhard
Bernstein was one of those left out.  In fact, he would never again
have steady, regular work for the rest of his life.  If the decision to lay
Gerhard Bernstein off during the depths of the economic crisis was
probably not racially motivated, the decisions not to rehire him al-
most certainly were.  The Nazis intended to rebuild the German
economy and German military might, but they did not intend to have
those whom they deemed to be Jews, or even Half-Jews, do the re-
building.67
Herbert’s mother, Käthe Franze, was not equipped to step in and
fill the economic role that her husband could not.  Women during the
Weimar Republic were subjected to pervasive discrimination in em-
ployment.  This discrimination increased sharply during the depres-
sion years immediately following Herbert’s birth, and continued
throughout the rest of the 1930s after the Nazis came to power.68  Not
well educated, with a small child, there was little chance that Käthe
would have been able to find regular work, and, in fact, she did not.
What work she did was merely what she could find in hopes of sup-
porting her small family.  The Bernstein family had to make it
through the 1930s on very little.
THE NUREMBERG LAWS
In September 1935, the National Socialist Party faithful gathered
to celebrate their annual ritual, the Reich Party Rally of Freedom.69
65. The overall unemployment rate in Hamburg at the beginning of 1934 was 40%.  Id.
66. See Auf dem Weg in die Kriegswirtschaft [Toward a War Economy], Museum für
Hamburgische Geschichte [Hamburg Museum], at http://www.hamburgmuseum.de/d/htm_d/
textversion/20jhd-1-11.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
67. See id. (discussing the negative impact that the ideological commitment to anti-
Semitism had on the Hamburg economy).
68. KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 408.
69. Id. at 566.  The spectacle of the Nuremberg rallies was captured in Leni Riefenstahl’s
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It was there that the Nazis promulgated the infamous Nuremberg
Laws. These Laws as a group were designed to isolate Jews from par-
ticipation in the civic life of the Reich, and to end sexual contact be-
tween Germans and German Jews.70  The implementing regulations
for these laws then defined, for the first time, categories of people of
partially Jewish descent, and attributed a legal status to them.71  To-
gether, they would play a decisive role in Herbert Bernstein’s life
over the ensuing decade.
The Reich Citizenship Law established two categories of citizen:
Reichsbürger and Staatsangehöriger.72  The law limited the status of
Reichsbürger to those Staatsangehöriger, who were persons of
“German and generically related blood.”73  Prior to the Third Reich,
the term Staatsangehöriger was used to refer to the citizen of a Land,
or state, within the Reich.  The Nazis had, however, abolished the
1934 documentary film of that year’s rally Triumph des Willens.  For information about and clips
from the film, see, Triumph of the Will, History Department of the University of San Diego, at
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/filmnotes/triumph.html (last modified Mar. 16, 1999).  The film
was re-released on June 18, 2002.  The advertisement for it on the Amazon web site notes that
“starring” in the film are “Adolf Hitler, Hermann Göring, et al.,” at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/B000065U6O/qid=1031841200/sr=1-1/
ref=sr_1_1/104-6561929-4973547?v=glance&s=video.
70. There were three Nuremberg laws: Reichsflaggengesetz [The Reich Flag Law]
v.15.9.1935 (RGB1.I S. 1145);Reichsbürgergesetz [The Reich Citizenship Law] v.15.9.1935
RGB1.I S. 1146) [hereinafter Reich Citizenship Law]; and the Gesetz zum Schutz des deutschen
Blutes und der deutschen Ehre [Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor]
v.15.9.1935 RGB1.I S. 1146-7) [hereinafter Blood Protection Law].  The Reich Flag Law estab-
lished that the official colors of the Reich were the old imperial colors of red, black and white,
and that the flag of the Reich was the swastika flag of the Nazi Party (Hakenkreutzflagge).
71. See Erste Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz [First Regulation on the Reich
Citizenship Law] v.14.11.1935 (RGB1.I S. 1333) [hereinafter First Regulation].  Section 2(2) of
the First Regulation provided: A Jewish mixed race person is someone who is descended from
one or two racially fully Jewish grandparents [Jüdischer Mischling ist, wer von einem oder zwei
der Rasse nach volljüdischen Grosseltern abstammt].  The various categories of Mischling
would in time be further divided into Mischling of the first and second grade, and into classes of
privileged and non-privileged within each grade.  The protocol of the Wannsee Conference, at
which Nazi leaders met to plan the Final Solution, provides a record of how elaborate this classi-
ficatory system finally became.  See Protokoll der “Wannsee-Konferenz” vom 20.  January 1942
[Protocol of the “Wannsee Conference” of January 20, 1942], available at http://
www.ghwk.de/protdt.htm. [hereinafter Protocol of the Wannsee Conference].  For an attempt at
explaining the terminology relating to persons of mixed Jewish ancestry, see German and Na-
tional Socialist Terminology at http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de  (last visited January 8, 2003).
72. When used in this context, both of these words translate into English as “citizen.”  See
Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4, at 11.
73. See Reich Citizenship Law, supra note 70, at §2(1) [“deutschen oder artverwandten
Blutes”].  This new category constituted a change from the previous distinction used in Nazi dis-
criminatory legislation of Aryan and non-Aryan.  It was, even by Nazi standards, a bizarre cate-
gory.  The Foreign Office assured the Turkish government that Turks were regarded as “generi-
cally related.”  Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4, at 14.
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Länder in 1934.74  Limiting the residual category of persons, that is
those not of “German and generically related” blood, to citizenship in
political entities that no longer existed might appear to be another
bad Nazi joke.75  In fact, the Nazis were using the term in an entirely
new way to refer to a second class form of citizenship.76  What that
citizenship entailed was not at all clear.77  What it did not entail soon
was.  Those who were only second class citizens could not vote, could
not hold public office, and could not, assuming they wanted to, wave
the Nazi flag.78
The Law for the Protection of German Blood and German
Honor79 (hereinafter referred to as the BPL) was an anti-
miscegenation law.  It attempted to prevent the creation of racially
mixed Jewish/German children by forbidding and criminally punish-
ing both marriages and extra-marital sex between Jews and Germans,
and by barring Jews from employing German females under the age
of forty-five in their households.  It was the first statutory expression80
74. Gesetz über den Neuaufbau des Reiches [Statute on the Reconstruction of the Reich]
v.30.1.1934 (RGB1.I S. 75).
75. Herbert Bernstein argued that the provision of the Blood Protection Law (section 4)
that made it criminal for Jews to display the German colors and flag, but guaranteed them the
right to display Jewish colors, was such a bad joke, since there were no “Jewish colors.”
Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4, at 13.
76. The leaders of the Jewish community at the time understood that this is what the Nazis
intended to do when they made use of the familiar term “Staatsangehöriger” in a new way to
create a previously unknown form of second class citizenship.  See German Jewish Response to
the Nuremberg Laws, Jüdische Rundschau, No. 77, September 24, 1935, available at
http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Holocaust/jewnurm.html.
77. The statute suggested that it did entail some sort of duties, since it defined a Staat-
sangehöriger as someone who was a member of the protective union of the German Reich [Sta-
atsangehöriger ist, wer dem Schutzverband des Deutschen Reiches angehört], and who was
thereby obligated to it [und ihm dafür besonders verpflichtet ist].  It provided that citizenship of
both types would be defined by laws related to each as they were developed and promulgated.
See Reich Citizenship Law, supra note 70, at §1(2).
78. See First Regulation, supra note 71.
79. Blood Protection Law, supra note 70.
80. It was not the first articulation of the view that Jews were a separate “race,” and that
racial identity was biological, not cultural.  Article 4 of the Nazi Party Platform, presented to the
Party at the Hofbräuhaus in Munich on February 24, 1920, and later declared “unalterable”
reads: “Staatsbüger kann nur sein, wer Volksgenosse ist.  Volksgenosse kann nur sein, wer
deutschen Blutes ist, ohne Rüchtsichtnahme auf Konfession.  Kein Jude kann daher Volksge-
nosse sein.”  [None but members of the nation may be citizens of the state.  None but those of
the German blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation.  No Jew, therefore,
may be a member of the nation.]  On the promulgation and reception of the NSDAP Party Plat-
form, see KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 144-45.  The text of the Party Program was
printed in pamphlet form and went through numerous editions.  This text is taken from
GOTTFRED FEDER, DAS PROGRAMM DER NSDAP UND SEINE WELTANSCHAULICHEN
GRUNDGEDANKEN [The Program of the NSDAP and its Philosophical Principles] 17 (1933).
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of the Nazis’ pseudo-scientific belief in a biological basis for their ra-
cial theories.
It was not at all clear at the time what the significance of these
laws was.  Some Jews welcomed them, particularly those provisions of
the BPL forbidding intermarriage.81  More viewed them as “the
heaviest of blows for Jews in Germany,” but also as potentially a basis
on which an accommodation might be worked out with the Nazi re-
gime.82  As with the initial flurry of anti-Jewish legislation in 1933, the
Nuremberg laws followed a period of escalating violence directed at
Jews, which, although certainly encouraged from the central Nazi
leadership, was carried out locally and with local initiative.83  The
Jüdische Rundschau expressed the hope that the laws might put an
end to this “defamation and boycott” and create a basis for a “toler-
able relationship” between Germans and Jews.84
These reactions were an attempt to make the best of a terrible
situation.  Jews in Germany in 1935 found themselves increasingly
isolated85 in a state that had cast aside the rule of law as constituting
any sort of limitation on its freedom of action, and which espoused no
ideals to which they could appeal in an effort to dissuade it from tak-
ing yet more discriminatory actions against them.  Nor was there rea-
son to believe that appeal to the international community was likely
to yield positive results.86  This was a time, Chaim Weizman noted,
when the world was divided into two camps: those who wanted to ex-
pel the Jews, and those who refused to take them in.87
Immediately after the laws were enacted, it appeared that, in
fact, there might be peace.  It was not peace with justice, but at least
81. See Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4, at 6.
82. See German Jewish Response to the Nuremberg Laws, supra note 76.
83. In addition, a number of local authorities passed discriminatory legislation against
Jews, some of it quite amazing.  One jurisdiction made it illegal to sell food to Jews.  See William
Zuckerman, Where the Ghetto Leads, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 1936, at 154, available at
http://newdeal.feri.org/nation/na36154.htm.
84. See German Jewish Response to the Nuremberg Laws, supra note 76.
85. In an article that appeared in The Nation in February 1936, William Zuckerman saw
with remarkable clarity the direction events would take in Germany over the next three years,
dismissing as naive the belief that the Nuremberg laws might bring an end to the lawless attacks
on Jews.  He insisted that the Jews were not necessarily isolated if they could bring themselves
to put aside their middle class prejudices, and make common cause with the working people of
Germany.  Zuckerman, supra note 83.
86. Id. (noting that even the friends of Jews in the international community naively be-
lieved that the Nuremberg laws might bring peace to the situation in Germany).
87. “The world is divided into two groups of nations – those that want to expel the Jews
and those that do not want to receive them.”  JOSEPH L. BARON, A TREASURY OF JEWISH
QUOTATIONS, 238 (n. rev. ed. 1965) (attributing the quotation to Chaim Weizmann).
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the tide of violence directed at Jews began to recede.  No longer un-
der the immediate pressure of constant harassment, many Jews con-
cluded that they could live with the situation, and the numbers at-
tempting to emigrate fell significantly.  In fact, approximately sixteen
thousand Jews who had already emigrated made the tragic decision to
come back.88  The lull in the violence and harassment proved to be
only temporary, and, by 1937, it was clear that the hope that the Nur-
emberg laws could serve as a basis for a workable relationship be-
tween Jews and the Nazi regime had proven groundless.
It seems implausible that five-year-old Herbert would have had
any real awareness of the Nuremberg laws at the time they were en-
acted.  He insisted, however, that by the time he was seven, he knew
that these laws had special meaning for him and his family.89  They
would, he later wrote, be the first laws he “encountered.”90  Herbert
had three memories of the ways in which he personally experienced
the Nuremberg  laws as a young child in the years before the war.
None of the memories involved anything that could be understood as
a direct legal consequence of the laws.  Rather, they were part of a
developing ethos in Germany that Jews were different, and were to
be treated differently and worse than other people.91  The first mem-
ory related to his classes in a gymnastics club that his mother had en-
rolled him in.  Käthe Bernstein was determined that her son would
disprove the racial stereotype that Jews were not good at sports.  Un-
fortunately for both of them, whatever the aptitude of Jews in general
for sports, Herbert as an individual was bad at them.  He tried all
manner of excuses to get his mother to let him out of this twice-
weekly humiliation, but with her greater size, authority and determi-
nation, she kept sending him back.  Then one day he was rescued by
the Nuremberg laws.92  He would not be permitted to continue to at-
88. Zuckerman, supra note 83.
89. Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4.
90. Id. at 1.
91. “The effect of the legislation upon the average law abiding German burgher . . . has
only been to put his legal conscience at rest.  It is no longer verboten to bait the Jew, to perse-
cute and humiliate him; so, therefore, it cannot be wrong.  On with the hunt!”  Zuckerman, su-
pra note 83.
92. Ironically, the group by-law that was promulgated to exclude him, supposedly in fur-
therance of the Nuremberg laws, was almost certainly invalid under them.  Section 6(2) of the
Reichsbürgergesetz provided that more stringent rules than those required in that statute, other
statutes or the Nazi Party rules, none of which were implicated by Herbert’s efforts in the gym-
nastics club, had to be authorized by the Ministry of the Interior and Hitler’s deputy.  As Her-
bert noted, no one, certainly not a person in his mother’s position, would have dared to com-
plain, and, in any case, he wasn’t complaining. See Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4, at 17
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tend the organization’s functions, his mother was informed, because
the group’s by-laws limited membership to “pure Aryans.”  Herbert
distinctly remembered how relieved he was to be the “victim” of such
discrimination.93  The second incident was less welcome.  Herbert at-
tended school with “Aryan” children his age.  One day in class, he
was, along with other students, getting a little wild and noisy.  The
teacher singled him out for punishment.  She let him know that he
was only “tolerated” in the school and should not risk the conse-
quences that might follow any new breaches of discipline.  As she
then put it, Herbert “should know why.”94  The third was less wel-
come still, the loss of his grandfather in 1937.  Leopold Bernstein, as
noted above, finally concluded that he would need to leave Germany
and seven-year-old Herbert.95  Herbert believed that the Nuremberg
laws were the final straw.
As an adult, in the months before his death, Herbert Bernstein
was in the process of giving mature scholarly reflection to the signifi-
cance of these laws.  Although those thoughts were still preliminary
and fragmentary, he had reached the definite conclusion that their
impact was profound.96  Their importance, he believed, did not, how-
ever, rest on the direct discriminatory burden that these laws placed
on Jews.  Rather, it rested on the fact that in them the Nazis had
committed the state to a racial definition of the society, and created
the fairly precise term for determining who would be targets of exclu-
sion from it.  “Horrible as this may sound, it was in this purely instru-
mental respect that these laws did provide a ‘central foundation’ to
the Holocaust, ‘necessary to carry on the later steps.’”97
n.89.
93. The by-laws of the gymnastics club did not free Herbert altogether from participation
in this hated activity.  Gymnastic training was an integral part of the activities of the Hitler
Youth, in which Herbert was compelled by law to participate, and of the schools that he at-
tended.  Much to his dismay, sports proved inescapable.
94. Again, the idea that it was appropriate to discriminate against him came out of the gen-
eral atmosphere of state-authorized hostility, not from the specific provisions of any statute.  In
fact, he was not even subject to the quotas under the relevant law, the Statute on the Over-
crowding of German Schools. Reichsgesetzblatt 1933 I., S 225.  Apparently, it was enough for
his teacher that he was “non-Aryan,” and she was not alone in her beliefs.  Hans Thielemann
reports that shortly after the announcement of the Nuremberg laws there was a marked increase
in anti-Jewish rhetoric at his school in Berlin, and his teacher gave the students in his class an
assignment to produce a family tree showing that they were of Aryan descent.  Thielemann, su-
pra note 46.  Herbert, had he been given such an assignment, would have failed, since he was
not.
95. Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4, at 1.
96. Id. at 7.
97. Id. (quoting Peter Loewenberg).
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Although the Nuremberg laws relegated Jews to second class
citizenship denying them the right to hold office or to vote, the non-
symbolic impact of the legislation was relatively slight.  Except for a
narrow class of persons exempted from the reach of the law by virtue
of service in the First World War, non-Aryans had already been
barred from holding public office, and the category of non-Aryans
was even broader than that of not of “German or German related
blood” used in the Nuremberg laws.  Nor were the rights of voting, or
the other privileges of citizenship, especially meaningful for those
who enjoyed the status of Reichsbürger.  By 1935, the Third Reich
was a one-party state,98 in which voting had little meaning for anyone.
The other usual privileges of citizenship in a modern state, such as
freedom of expression and the right to petition for redress of griev-
ances, had been abrogated in February, 1933 and were never restored
under the Nazis.99  The Constitution provided no protection for any-
one of whatever blood.  Hitler, acting nominally as the Reich Cabinet,
had the authority to promulgate laws that “deviated” from the Con-
stitution without bothering to consult the legislature, or in fact any-
one else.100  One’s status as a first-class citizen provided no protection
against arbitrary arrest and detention in concentration camps, and, by
1935, tens of thousands of Germans had been.101
The Nuremberg laws did not, moreover, announce some new
principle that had never been articulated before.  As noted above, the
Nazi Party Platform had insisted both that Jews were a separate race,
not merely a different religion or culture, and one that could never be-
come a part of the German nation.102  What was new and critical was
that this position was now articulated in a statute, and done so in a way
that provided a set of definitions and categories that facilitated and
shaped its implementation.  It thus created the framework and the un-
derlying rationale for each of the steps leading to the Holocaust.103
98. See Statute Against the Creation of New Political Parties, supra note 34.  Section 1 de-
clared that the Nazi Party was the only political party, thereby abolishing all of the other parties
that were in existence at the time.  Section 2 provided for the criminal punishment of anyone
who subsequently attempted to establish another political party.
99. See Verordnung des Reichspräsident zum Schutz von Volk und Staat [Decree of the
Reichs President relating to the Defense of the People and the State] v.28.2.1933 (RGB1.IS. 83).
100. Law for the Removal of the Distress of People and Reich, supra note 33 at v.24.3.1933.
See also supra text accompanying note 34.
101. KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 459-60.
102. See FEDER, supra text accompanying note 80.
103. Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4, at 7.
1HAAGAN_FMT 09/10/03  4:12 PM
Special Issue 2003] THE EARLY LIFE OF HERBERT BERNSTEIN 27
Those arbitrary definitions and categories unarguably had a di-
rect impact on Herbert Bernstein’s life.  In the decrees implementing
the Reich Citizenship Law and the BPL,104 the Nazis created the legal
category of Mischling to deal with persons of mixed ancestry.105  The
decrees further set out which of these persons could be safely reab-
sorbed in the German Volk, without threatening the corruption of the
race.  The line was drawn at one Jewish grandparent.106
Herbert was thus classified as one of those non-Aryans whose
descendants could be absorbed into the German race.  As a non-
Aryan, he remained subject to all of the discriminatory legislation
that affected non-Aryans.  He could not become a member of the
civil service, or work for the Reichsbank or the rail system.  But he
was entitled to hoist the Nazi flag, and was required to join the Hitler
Youth.  Unless the rules changed, if he married a German woman, his
children would not be subject to the restrictions that he would have to
suffer.  But the fact that he enjoyed a special status could not protect
his father, or his Bernstein relatives.  Nor were the race laws the only
threat that he faced as a result of the unhappy fact that he was a child
in the Third Reich.  At 4:30 in the morning of September 1, 1939,
Germany invaded Poland.  Two days later, Great Britain declared
war on Germany.  It was a war that ultimately would free Herbert
Bernstein from the world of the Nuremberg laws, and the limited
place in society that the Nazis had relegated him to.  But he would
experience a lot of hardship in the six years between that invasion,
and the final destruction of the Third Reich.
104. First Regulation, supra note 71; Blood Protection Law, supra note 70, v.14.11.1935
(RGB1.I S. 1334).
105. A Mischling was a person with one or two “in the racial sense” fully Jewish grandpar-
ents.  A grandparent was considered fully Jewish if he belonged to a Jewish religious commu-
nity.”  First Regulation, supra note 71, at §§2(2),  5(1).  The definition thus actually contained
elements of the racial definition insisted on by the Nazi Party Platform, and the cul-
tural/religious affiliation relied on the definition of non-Aryan in the first decree implementing
the Professional Civil Service Law in 1933.  The Wannsee Protocol, apparently relying on some
combination of doubt about the reliability of evidence relating to ancestry, and possibly fears
about particularly virulent strains of Jewish blood, provided that Mischling of the second class
were to be treated as Jews if they had features that were “especially unappealing racially.”  See
Protocol of the Wannsee Conference, supra note 71, at §4(2)(b).
106. Mischling with one Jewish grandparent did not require a special license from the Minis-
ter of the Interior in order to marry a German, but did require one to marry a Jew, or a
Mischling with two Jewish grandparents.  They were not supposed to marry another Mischling
with one Jewish grandparent [“soll nicht gesclossen werden”], but did not require a license to do
so.  Blood Protection Law, supra note 104.  The clear intent of the regulations was to insure that
the blood that had been contaminated by intermarriage with Jews would be diluted to a level
that no longer constituted a threat.
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LISTENING TO THE BBC
Herbert’s family, for fairly obvious reasons, developed a deep
skepticism about information put out by the government.  They
turned instead to the BBC,107 and continued to listen to it, albeit cau-
tiously and with a watchful eye on their neighbors, throughout the
war.108  It was, Herbert told me, a source not only of information, but
also of hope, especially following the arrests of various members of
his family.
In the wake of the repeated bombings visited by the British on
Hamburg, and the repeated destruction of their own living quarters in
those bombings, it would have seemed natural to me if the Bernsteins
had felt anger and resentment toward the Allies, and discontinued the
practice.  Herbert insisted that he, at least, did not, not even as he
picked his way through the remnants of yet another apartment, trying
to salvage what he could.  It was clear to him at time, he told me, that
the British were merely doing unto Hamburg, what had been done to
them.  He wanted no part of yet another round of reprisals and re-
venge.109  The members of the circle in which he lived were convinced
that after the winter of 1942, the Allies would win sooner or later.  He
107. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) began the European Service with broad-
casts in German on September 27, 1938.  See Trevor Worthy, The Unofficial Guide to the BBC,
British Broadcasting Corporation, at http://www.vaxxine.com/mastercontrol/BBC/ chap-
ters/Dates.html (last modified Mar. 26, 2000).  See also Geoffrey Wheatcroft, Who Needs the
BBC, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 2001, at 53.
108. Listening to the BBC constituted, along with spreading rumors and making jokes about
the Nazi regime, the criminal act of treachery (Heimtuckeangelelegenheiten).  It was a charge
used against persons not associated with any organized opposition to the regime such as the
Communists or Social Democrats.  During April, May and June, 1944, an average of approxi-
mately 1,500 Germans a month were arrested for treachery.  See GABRIEL A. ALMOND &
WOLFGANG KRAUSS, The Size and Composition of the Anti-Nazi Opposition in Germany,
PSOnline (Sept. 1999), http://apsanet.org/PS/sept99/almond.cfm (including introductory notes
by the author).  This report was prepared in connection with the HAMBURG FIELD REPORT,
supra note 12, immediately following the war.  The original manuscript is in the National Ar-
chives in Washington.  For an account of a German family that similarly relied on the BBC to
discover what was happening around them before and during the war, see Thielemann, supra
note 46.
109. A much fuller, but remarkably similar, articulation of these same sentiments was pub-
lished in a pamphlet put out by the NKFD (Nationalkommittee Freies Deutschlands, or Na-
tional Committee for a Free Germany) in Leipzig in December, 1943, in an effort to counter
Nazi propaganda efforts to rally Germans to the war effort by denouncing the Luftterror visited
on Germany by the Allies.  The NKFD was an opposition group founded at the Krasnogorsk
prisoner of war camp in July, 1943.  The Leipzig chapter was founded in September, 1943.  Al-
mond & Krauss, supra note 108.  In the aftermath of Operation Gomorrah, Hitler suggested
that his propaganda people tell the German public that the Luftwaffe had successfully mined
the Humber estuary: “‘You only break terror through terror! Everything else is rubbish.’” IAN
KERSHAW, HITLER, 1936-1945: NEMESIS 598 (2000) [hereinafter KERSHAW, NEMESIS].
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listened to the BBC hoping for the reports that their victory would
come sooner rather than later, and before it was too late for him, and
his family and the people of Germany.
A CIVILIAN IN THE AGE OF AIR POWER
Most contemporary observers agreed that there was no enthusi-
asm among the German population in 1939 for another war.110  Wil-
liam Shirer, an American correspondent writing from Berlin on
August 31, 1939, thought that the Nazis would not actually go to war
“‘with a population so dead set against it.’”111  What Shirer failed to
understand was that the hopes and fears of ordinary citizens did not
matter much in Nazi Germany, and they “were powerless to affect the
course of events.”112  War would and did come, with or without the en-
thusiasm and blessing of ordinary Germans.  Those ordinary Ger-
mans had strong reason to believe that the consequences for them
would be bad.  The preparations for war, begun as early as 1935,
made it clear that in this conflict everyone would be vulnerable.113
In the First World War, after the extraordinarily rapid move-
ment of German troops through nearly all of Belgium in the initial
weeks of the conflict, the front in the West stabilized and moved very
little for the rest of the war.  Conditions and casualty rates along that
front were appalling for both sides, but most civilians, even those just
a short distance away, were relatively safe from violent death.114  The
British naval blockade of Germany did produce catastrophic short-
ages of food and other essential materials, but defensive tactics of
both sides were too well developed to permit the armies of either suc-
cessfully to penetrate the front.
110. KERSHAW, NEMESIS, supra note 109, at 200-21.
111. Id. at 221.
112. Id.
113. See Hamburg im Krieg [Hamburg During the War], Museum für Hamburgische
Geschichte [Hamburg Museum], at http://www.hamburgmuseum.de/d/htm_d/textversion/20jhd-
1-13.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002) (explaining that air raid exercises started in Hamburg in
1935, and blackout exercises two years later).
114. The situation in the east was less secure, both because there was greater movement in
the front, and because civil war broke out in Russia and destroyed the ability of the Czarist gov-
ernment to control events.  Some commentators estimate the number of civilian casualties in
Russia during and immediately after the First World War at two million.  See THE EUROPEAN
POWERS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR (Spencer C. Tucker, et al., eds., 1999).  J. Bradford De-
Long gives total military casualties in the First World War as ten million killed and twenty-one
million wounded out of sixty-five million men mobilized, and total civilian casualties as a tenth
that number.  He estimates that during the Second World War civilian casualties exceeded mili-
tary casualties.  See J. BRADFORD DELONG, SLOUCHING TOWARDS UTOPIA?: THE ECONOMIC
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There were air attacks, and they did result in civilian casualties.
One raid by German bi-planes on London on June 13, 1917 resulted
in 97 deaths and injured 439 others.115  The aircraft that carried out
these raids were, however, too primitive to do sustained extensive
damage.  It was readily apparent that as aircraft got better, things
would be much worse for civilians in the next war.116  Stanley Baldwin
explained the new reality in stark terms in a speech to the House of
Commons:
I think it is well . . . for the man in the street to realise that there is
no power on earth that can prevent him from being bombed. What-
ever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through.117
The relative safety of civilian populations behind the front lines was a
relic of the past.
The British government, recognizing this change in the reality of
warfare, started making plans to evacuate women and children from
cities and towns as early as the mid 1930s.  In July 1939, fearing that
Germany would attack from the air prior to an all-out invasion that it
assumed would be imminent, the Chamberlain administration began
taking active measures to prepare for the mass evacuation of school
children from urban areas.118  Those plans were put into effect fol-
lowing Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939.119  The
actual evacuation began on September 3, the day that Britain de-
clared war on Germany.120  The Chamberlain government had, how-
HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 8 (February 1997) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://econ161.berkeley.edu/TCEH/Slouch_WWI10.html.
115. See The Popular Outrage, at http://www.btinternet.com/~eastlondonpostcard/Nov01.
htm.
116. “As early as May 1924 a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense [in Brit-
ain] began a study of air raid pre-cautions.”  Blitz Web Exhibition, Museum of London, at http://
www.museum-london.org.uk/MOLsite/exhibits/blitz/prepare/prepare.htm (last modified March
12, 2002).
117. Id.
118. Children and the War: An Overview, Holnet: London at War 1939 – 1945, at
www.holnet.org.uk/learningzone/londonatwar/childrenthewar/index.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2002).
119. Adolf Hitler, Proclamation to the German Army (September 1, 1939), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/gp1.htm.
120. On the declaration of war, see Neville Chamberlain, Address in the House of Com-
mons (September 1, 1939), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/gb1.htm;
Communication from the German Government to the British Government-September 3, 1939,
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/gp3.htm; Neville Chamberlain, Address in
the House of Commons (September 3, 1939), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/ ava-
lon/wwii/gb2.htm.  On the beginning of the evacuation of children from London, see Children
and the War: An Overview, supra note 118.  The scale of the operation was extraordinary.
827,000 school children and 103,000 teachers, 524,000 children below school age along with their
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ever, overestimated the capability of their adversary.  The feared air
attacks on London did not come, or rather did not come in 1939.121
It does not appear that the German government gave anything
like the same attention to the desirability of evacuating German chil-
dren as the British government had given to evacuating British chil-
dren.122  Their efforts were concentrated instead on developing de-
fense systems to protect the cities from attack, and shelters to protect
the citizens if the air attack succeeded.123  This difference in approach
may have reflected a certain failure of the imagination on the part of
the leadership of the Nazi government.  Through the initial phases of
the Battle of Britain, the Nazis appear to have thought in terms of at-
tacking, not of being attacked.124  Less thought, therefore, may have
been given to the consequences air war for the civilian population,
even if it could be protected from the immediate impact of bombing.
The retaliatory raid on Berlin in immediate response to the ini-
tial attack on London made it clear, however, that the Reich could be
bombed.125  By mid-September, 1940, it was becoming obvious that
mothers, and 12,000 pregnant women were all evacuated.  Id.
121. In fact, British bombers successfully attacked German cities, before British cities came
under attack from the Luftwaffe.  In an effort to counter the German offensive in the West,
British Bomber Command targeted sites in the Rhine/Ruhr industrial area as early as May,
1940.  Introduction, Battle of the Ruhr, Historical Center Hagen at http://www.hco.hagen.de/
ruhr/uk/uk-1.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).  For an account of the impact of these early raids on
the city of Hagen, see Die Stadthagen im Zweiten Welt Krieg [The City of Hagen in the Second
World War], Historical Center Hagen at www.hco.hagen.de/ns-zeit/hagen/index.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 4, 2002).  These early attacks were fairly modest in scale and limited largely to military
and industrial targets.  When the Germans finally did begin their attacks on Britain in July 1940,
theirs followed this same pattern.  In the middle of August 1940, the first element in that pattern
changed dramatically.  The previously scattered attacks on airfields and aircraft manufacturing
facilities became dramatically more massive and intense.  In the first week in September 1940,
the second element in the pattern changed as the Luftwaffe turned its massive attacks on British
cities and their civilian populations.
122. The HAMBURG FIELD REPORT noted that the practice of sending city children to the
countryside for vacations, begun as early as 1915, and later put under the authority of the Na-
tionalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt, the Nazi welfare organization, formed the basic organiza-
tional pattern for the later developed plan to evacuate children from potential target areas.
HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 156.
123. If the German government gave less attention to the issue of evacuation, it probably
gave more attention to the provision of air raid shelters.  The protocols relating to those shelters
were, unlike those in Britain, calculated to save lives at the expense of property damage.  Id. at
16.
124. “Göring had once joked that should British planes ever reach Germany, his name was
not Hermann Göring, but Hermann Meier.”  After the bombing of Berlin on August 25, 1940,
the night after the first massive Luftwaffe raid on the East End of London, Berliners took to
calling him “Herr Meier.”  KERSHAW, NEMESIS, supra note 109, at 309.
125. Hitler, in keeping with his usual response to being threatened, promised massive re-
taliation for the retaliatory British raid.  “‘We’ll wipe out their cities! We’ll put an end to the
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the air campaign had not succeeded in destroying either the Royal
Air Force or the will of the British people to resist, and that it was
likely that German cities and German civilians increasingly were go-
ing to come under attack.  In Hamburg, it was clear even earlier.  By
August 3, approximately fifty air raid warnings had sent the residents
of the city down into the air raid shelters for safety.126
THE KINDERLANDVERSCHICKUNG127
On September 27, 1940, Adolf Hitler issued a Führerbefehl call-
ing for the voluntary evacuation of children from areas likely to be
subject to bombing.128  This was then followed by an intensive cam-
paign in the press and on radio to encourage parents to agree to send
their children to safer areas.129  The campaign undoubtedly found a
receptive audience among the parents of Hamburg.  The initial Brit-
ish air raids did not inflict extensive damage, but the air raid warnings
proved extraordinarily disruptive to the lives of those in the city.130
There were nearly two hundred air warnings in Hamburg during the
second half of 1940, each of which required parents to drag their chil-
dren from their beds and into the shelters.131  Children suffered
greatly from this routine, especially when it was repeated for several
nights in a row.132  Those, like Herbert who were of school age were
seldom in any condition to study after spending the night in an air
raid shelter, and the government was forced to pass a law delaying the
start of school until ten o’clock on the day following one of these
alarms.133  In hopes of saving their children and themselves from this
disruption, the parents of approximately 80,000 Hamburg children
agreed to have them sent to the interior of the Reich.134  The organiza-
work of these night pirates.’”  Id. at 309.
126. WOLFF-MÖNCKEBERG, supra note 8, at 38.  During all of 1940, there were 78 actual air
raids on the city.  HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
127. Translated literally, it means the sending of children into the countryside.  Early in the
war, it was a genuinely voluntary program, and there was a high level of parental cooperation.
After 1943, it became increasingly coercive and encountered greater resistance from parents.
128. The actual order was issued by Reichsleiter Martin Bormann.  The evacuation began
on October 3, 1940.  Authority for organizing the Kinderlandverschickung was entrusted to the
Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt under the leadership of Baldur von Schirach, available at
http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/klv/index.html.
129. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 156.




134. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 156. See WOLFF-MÖNCKEBERG, supra
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tional unit was the school class, and the children generally were sent
together along with their teacher.  Ten-year-old Herbert Bernstein and
his classmates were in that first group of evacuees, and were sent across
the country to the pilgrimage town of Altötting in Bavaria.135
ENCOUNTERING CATHOLIC BAVARIA
Most of the children who were sent from Hamburg to the coun-
tryside as part of the Kinderlandverschickung recalled the experience,
as adults, with great fondness.  In their memories, at least, it was
“eine schoene Zeit,” a beautiful time.136  In comparison with the fear
engendered and the disruption caused by bombing raids, the quiet life
in the villages of the interior must have been a welcome relief.  If the
children had to cope with being taken from their homes and parents,
they were at least going with their classmates, and often, entire
schools.  They were, moreover, under the familiar and hopefully com-
forting supervision of their teachers.137  Herbert did not so remember
his experience.  At age 71, in the final months of before his death, he
still recalled it as one of the difficult times of his life.  He did not re-
member peaceful countryside and freedom from bombing.  He re-
membered the feeling of being an unwanted outsider in a very foreign
place.138
note 8, at 38 (“since late autumn most teachers and school children have been evacuated to
safer districts”).
135. Many of the records related to the operation of the Kinderlandverschickung in Ham-
burg were destroyed during the war.  There are about 180 files from the Hamburg Ent-
sendungsgau in the Hamburg Staatsarchiv that may contain information about Herbert Bern-
stein, but they are unpublished and I was unable to get access to them.  See E-mail from Erich
Maylahn, 2.Vorsitzender [vice-chairman] der Dokumentations-Arbeitsgemeinschaft KLV e.V.
[Vice-Chairman of the Kinderlandverschickang Documents Study Group], to Paul Haagen, Pro-
fessor, Duke University School of Law (March 5, 2002) (on file with author).  There are appar-
ently no surviving records in Altötting relating to the Hamburg children.  See E-mail from Rich-
ard Bauer, Einwohnermeldeamt Altötting [Residents’ Registration Office of Altötting Bavaria],
to Paul Haagen, Professor, Duke University School of Law, (March 18, 2002) (on file with
author).
136. See E-mail from Erich Maylahn, supra note 135.
137. In addition to trying to make certain that the children had the support of their teacher
and classmates, the authorities also made serious efforts to insure that they had adequate health
care.  Id.
138. The way in which I learned of Herbert’s experiences in Altötting was typical of the way
in which I learned about many of the things in his past.  My secretary, Frances Hamacher, was
leaving for a bicycling trip in Germany and Austria.  In the course of discussing the trip with
her, I told her about a weekend that I had spent with a friend from the Max-Planck-Institut für
Biochemie at a farmhouse in Bavaria.  Herbert asked me where it was, and I told him Altötting.
He recalled his own very different experiences there, and then went back to work.
It seems likely that Herbert’s awareness that his personal background meant that he was
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Under the best of circumstances, ten-year-old Herbert Bern-
stein’s initial encounter with Catholic Bavaria would have been a dif-
ficult and wrenching experience.  His leaving was not under the best
of circumstances.  It was his first time away from home and his par-
ents.  He had left under frightening conditions, unclear about the
dangers that his parents were about to be exposed to, at a time when
it was not at all clear whether the danger to them was greater from
the sky or their own government.  The allied bombing of Hamburg
had begun, and one of his grandfathers and his father’s two brothers
had already reached the conclusion that they had to flee Germany.
He can have had no way of knowing what might happen to his par-
ents while he was gone, and what would happen to him if something
did.
The place that he was leaving, the only world that he had known,
was a cosmopolitan, commercial center.  The place he was going was
about as different as any place in Germany could have been.139  Even
the language there, Herbert recalled, seemed only superficially simi-
lar to the one spoken in his native city, and initially he had a great
deal of trouble understanding it.  He and his classmates were going
more than across the Reich.  They were going from possibly the most
liberal, western-oriented, Protestant places in Germany, to Bavaria,
the most Catholic and traditional.  They were, moreover, being sent
to the most Catholic and traditional of places in Bavaria, the pilgrim-
age town of Altötting,140 and to a convent, the most Catholic, conser-
vative and traditional of institutions in the town.141
only “tolerated,” which had been forcefully impressed on him several years earlier by his
teacher in Hamburg, must have greatly increased his anxiety when he encountered both hostility
and a world that he could not understand.
139. After the mass evacuation of Hamburg in July, 1943, it was reported that those who
were sent to countryside in the vicinity of Hamburg were received remarkably warmly by the
local inhabitants, but those sent to Bavaria encountered considerable hostility from the local
population, who referred to the refugees derisively as “Bombenpack Preussen,” “a pack of
bombed out Prussians.”  MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK, THE BATTLE OF HAMBURG 358 (1981).  It is
likely that the Hamburg children encountered an analogous, if probably more muted, reaction
two and a half years earlier.
140. At the time Herbert arrived in Altötting, it was a village of about six thousand inhabi-
tants.  “Bis zum Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges zählte Altötting etwa 6,000 Einwohner.” “At
the beginning of the Second World War Altötting had approximately 6,000 inhabitants.” City of
Altötting in the heart of Bavaria at  http://www.altoetting.de.
141. It appears that Herbert was housed in either the Kreszentiaheim on Kreszentiaheim-
strasse near the Gnadenkappelle, or in the nearby Franziskushaus on Neuöttingerstrasse.  See
E-mail from Richard Bauer, supra note 135.  From Herbert’s description, it seems marginally
more likely that it was the Kreszentiaheim, but it is difficult to have any confidence in that con-
clusion.  See id.
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Under ideal conditions and with the best of will, the experience
would have been a trying one for all concerned.  Herbert recalled it as
profoundly disorienting.  It must have been a serious trial for the nuns
as well.  The imposition of any group of children would have been a
major disruption to their religious, communal lives.  The fact that the
imposition was of a group of non-Catholic children from the very for-
eign world of northwest Germany would have made it all the more
difficult to bear.142  The uncertainty about how long these children
would be staying would have further added to the sense of anxiety for
both groups.  These were not, however, ideal conditions and the will
was more ill than good.  In one of those bits of horrendous timing that
seemed to have plagued Herbert Bernstein’s early life, the arrival of
the children coincided with greatly heightened tensions between the
Catholic Church in Bavaria and the Nazi Party.
The relationship between the Nazi Party and the Christian, and
especially Catholic Churches, was never better than ambivalent.143  If
the Churches initially were comforted by the anti-communism of the
Nazis, and hopeful that the Party might lead to the moral revitaliza-
tion of a demoralized Germany,144 they were also horrified by the Na-
zis’ attitude toward the weak,145 and worried about the exclusivity of
the demands that the Nazis made on the loyalty of their adherents.
The Nazis, in turn, showed great concern that the Christian Churches
continued to command the loyalty of believers and to serve as an al-
ternative source of authority within the state.146  Nazi rhetoric against
the Churches was frequently violent.147  In early 1937, Hitler declared
that “Christianity was ripe for destruction” and that “at some point in
the future . . . the entire force of the Party [would be] turned to the
destruction of the clerics.”148
142. Refugees from northwest Germany were, in general, not well received in Bavaria,
where they were perceived as outsiders.   My own experience as an American student living in
Bavaria in the summer of 1974 suggested just how strongly rural Bavarians associated the word
Prussian with unacceptable outsiders.  My failure to understand some rule of etiquette in a Bier-
stube in the town of Burghausen, close to Altötting, led the locals to dismiss me not as an
American, but as a “Prussian.”
143. KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 432, 436.
144. Id at 432.
145. KERSHAW, NEMESIS, supra note 109, at 252-61 (discussing the Nazi euthanasia pro-
gram and the Churches’ resistance to it).
146. KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 436.
147. In January, 1925, Erich von Ludendorff’s attacks on the Catholic Church became so
extreme that even Hitler had to take steps to distance himself from them.  Id. at 262.
148. KERSHAW, NEMESIS, supra note 109, at 40.  Nor was the violence merely rhetorical.  In
1937, Goebbels orchestrated a series of “immorality trials” against Franciscans.  Id.
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Few in the Party were more committed to this radical anti-
Christian policy than the Gauleiter of Upper Bavaria and Bavarian
Education and Interior Minister, Adolf Wagner.149  Despite repeated
warnings from Hitler that the time was not yet ripe for open conflict
with the Churches,150 Wagner seized on encouragement from others in
the Party hierarchy, especially Martin Bormann, to initiate an assault
on the Catholic Church in Bavaria.151  Church publications were
banned.  Monastic properties were confiscated or sequestered for use
on behalf of refugees, like the children from Hamburg.  Nuns were
replaced by the “brown shirt sisters” of the Nationalsozialistische
Volkswohlfahrt, the Nazi welfare organization.  There were attempts
to abolish school prayers and remove crucifixes from the schools.
Party officials even interfered with the Church calendar, shifting feast
days to Sundays.152
The reaction in Bavaria against these policies got so strong that
Hitler was forced to step in and restrain Wagner.153  The restraint,
such as it was, did not come in time to help Herbert.  He had been
dropped into a hornet’s nest of anger and suspicion, and would feel
the wrath of the religious and civic community of Altötting for the en-
tire length of his stay.  In the eyes of the nuns, the fact that Herbert
and his fellow classmates wore the black uniforms of the Jungvolk
made it clear that they were the other.  This identity that had been
thrust on Herbert,154 and for which he felt no personal affiliation, be-
149. Id.
150. Id. at 39, 424.
151. Id. at 425.
152. Id. at 424-25.  As with much else in a government that operated according to the notion
of “working toward the Führer,” it was not always easy to determine who was actually doing
what according to what authority.  Wagner later claimed that he was acting under the authority
of Reichsleiter Bormann “‘to give visible effect to the teaching . . . that Socialism and Christian-
ity are irreconcilable opposites.’”  Id. at 424.  Kershaw concludes that Wagner had probably
misinterpreted “Hitler’s repeated rantings.”  Id. Given his own predilections, Wagner had every
reason to engage in an expansive interpretation of those rantings.  On the operation of the con-
cept of working toward the Führer, see KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 527-91.
153. KERSHAW, NEMESIS, supra note 109, at 428-29.  Kershaw notes that it was only the
need to act pragmatically that induced Hitler to restrain the radicals, and that Hitler made it
plain that he fully approved of the closing of the monasteries.  Kershaw adds: “Events in the
Warthegau (where, by 1941, 94 percent of churches and chapels in the Posen-Gnesen diocese
were closed, 11 percent of the clergy murdered, and most of the remainder thrust into prisons
and concentration camps) showed the face of the future.”  Id. at 428.
154. Gesetz über die Hitlerjugend [Law on the Hitler Youth], V.1.12.1936 (RGB1.I S. 993),
implemented by Zweite Durchführungsverordnung . . . (Jugenddienstverordnung )[The Second
Implementing Regulation . . . (Youth Service Decree)], v.25.3.1939 (RGB1.I S. 710) (requiring
every German boy over the age of ten to join the Deutsches Jungvolk, a junior affiliate of the
Hitler youth).  Herbert was ten at the time that he was sent to Altötting.
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came a reason to mistreat him.
Recalling those months sixty years after the event, Herbert could
no longer remember in any detail the various slights and indignities to
which he had been subjected.  What he could recall with distressing
clarity was the iconography of this very different world.155  The images
of Marian Christianity that he discovered in Altötting had no ana-
logues in the austere simplicity of the North, and they frightened him.
He distinctly remembered lying on his bed in the convent with moon-
light streaming in his window illuminating a picture of the suffering
Christ that hung in his room.  He recalled lying there night after night
exhausted, but too frightened to shut his eyes.  He recalled wanting to
get up and turn the picture around so that it faced the wall and not
him, but being too frightened of the nuns to dare.  Sixty years later, as
he recalled that image, he shuddered visibly.
When the British began the evacuation of children from London
the day that Britain declared war on the Third Reich, they overesti-
mated the imminence of the German threat from the air.  With no
bombs falling around them, parents quite naturally started bringing
their children home and reuniting their families.  By the late spring of
1940, approximately three quarters of the children and mothers who
had been evacuated had returned to London.  Something quite simi-
lar happened with the first group of children evacuated from Ham-
burg in the Kinderlandverschickung a year later.  The air raids that so
tortured the sleep of the children of Hamburg in the late summer and
early fall of 1940 became increasingly less frequent in early 1941.156
Gradually, one by one, the parents of Herbert’s classmates made their
way to Altötting to collect their offspring.  Gradually, the size of the
contingent of Hamburg children in the convent dwindled.  Herbert’s
parents did not come to get him, and apparently did not explain why.
Herbert told me that he assumed the problem was that they did not
have the resources to come and get him, but while he tended to be
very clear and specific on most matters related to his experiences
during the war, he was always notably vague on this matter.  What he
was not vague about was the emotion of feeling abandoned as he
watched the other children gathered up one by one and brought
155. See J. Issickener, Buchlein der Zupfluct der Maria [Little Book of Seeking Refuge in
Mary](1497), available at http://www.godecookery.com/macabre/gallery5/macabre5.htm (last
visited Oct. 4, 2002) (to view The Altar of the Virgin of Alt-Oetting, an example of the sort of
icongraphy that so distressed him at the time).
156. In 1940, there were 78 air raids on Hamburg.  In 1941 and 1942 combined, there were
48.  HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
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home, while he remained in Altötting to face the picture of the suf-
fering Christ.
Eventually, someone did come to get him in the late spring of
1941 and he thankfully returned to Hamburg.  The bad timing that af-
flicted his early life surfaced again.  Just as those who returned to
London in the spring of 1940 had to face the Blitz that fall, Herbert
managed to return to Hamburg in time to face what an American in-
telligence report concluded was “the worst holocaust in history.”157
DISCOVERING THE CONSEQUENCES
OF RACIAL CATEGORIES
In 1942, twelve-year-old Herbert and his father took a sad rail
journey from Hamburg to Berlin.158  They were traveling there to say
goodbye to Gerhard’s sister Erna, her husband, Herbert’s grandfather
Leopold Bernstein’s sister, and several other Bernstein relatives.  All
of them had received their deportation orders and were about to be
sent to the east.  Because they were leaving the Reich, albeit involun-
tarily under compulsion of law, their property would be confiscated as
soon as they left.159  Some time after Herbert and his father returned
to Hamburg and the rapidly dwindling Bernstein presence there,
Gerhard was himself arrested and sent to Neuengamme.  At age
twelve, Herbert had to assume the role of male head of the Bernstein
family.  He was all that was left in Hamburg.  His father, grandfather
and uncles all had been imprisoned or had fled the Reich.
The Neuengamme camp, where Gerhard Bernstein was interned,
was first established in December 1938, when an SS unit based at
Sachsenhausen transferred one hundred prisoners to an abandoned
157. Id. at 31.  The use of the word “holocaust” to describe what happened to Hamburg may
seem jarring to modern readers, who have come to associate the term with the Nazi genocide.
The American researchers were not making any sort of comparison between that genocide and
the Allied destruction of Hamburg.  They used the term to mean an all-consuming fire.
158. The account of that trip and the analysis of the Nazi regulations relating to racial status
draws heavily on Herbert Bernstein’s unfinished manuscript, Bernstein, Reflections, supra note
4, at 17.
159. Persons deemed Jews had a second class form of citizenship known as Staatsangehörig-
keit, as opposed to full citizenship of Reichsangehörigkeit. Elfte Durchführungsverordnung zum
Reichsbürgergesetz [The Eleventh Regulation for the Implementation of the Reichsbürgerge-
setz] v.25.11.1941 (RGB1.I S.722).  The Eleventh Regulation for the Implementation of the
Reichsbürgergesetz provided that persons who possessed only Staatsangehörigkeit lost all rights
of citizenship if they left Germany.  Property of such persons was subject to being seized by the
state.  The Eleventh Regulation was interpreted to apply to Jews forcibly deported to concen-
tration camps outside the Reich. Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4, at 4.
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brickworks near Hamburg.160  The SS intended to re-open the brick-
works and use the inmates to supply bricks for the Führer buildings
that were scheduled to be constructed as part of the Nazis’ plans for
redevelopment of the Elbe.  The camp was not, however, destined to
play such a modest role.  By June 4, 1940, Neuengamme already had
approximately 2,000 inmates, and was reorganized as an independent
concentration camp.161  At the time of Gerhard’s arrest in 1942, it had
dramatically increased in size, and its role was changing again.  To ac-
commodate the large number of new inmates sent to the camp, satel-
lite camps administered from Neuengamme were set up throughout
the region.  Eventually, there would be ninety-six of these satellite
camps.162  According to Herbert, his father spent most of the time that
he was interned in one of these camps in Schleswig Holstein.
Although never organized as a death camp, Neuengamme saw
more than its share of death.  Sanitary conditions at the camp were
appalling, and there was an almost total lack of medical care.163  The
provision of food and shelter was wholly inadequate, especially after
the sharp increase in the number of inmates sent there beginning in
1942.  This neglect and mismanagement were then supplemented by
harassment and abuse of the prisoners by SS guards and their helpers,
and thousands of cases of outright murder.164  Almost 60% of the
95,000 persons sent to the camp between 1940 and 1945 died there.165
Beginning in 1942, some Neuengamme inmates were used in ar-
maments production.  The percentage of those so engaged increased
over the course of the remainder of the war, and may, after 1944,
have been the majority of them.166  According to Herbert, his father
was not involved in this activity.  He was assigned to dig graves.
There would have been no shortage of work given the death rate at
the camp.  In addition, Neuengamme inmates were also used to help
clear up wreckage and remove bodies after the air raids on Hamburg
160. See Concentration Camp Memorial Neuengamme, at http://www.hamburg.de/
Neuengamme/welcome.en.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002); Vincent Chatel & Chuck Ferree,
Neuengamme, The Forgotten Camps, at http://jewishgen.org/FogottenCamps/Camps/
NeuengammeEng/html (last modified July 16, 2002).
161. Erna and her husband were initially sent to Theresienstadt in what is now the Czech
Republic.  He was then sent on to one of the death camps.  Which one, I do not know, and Her-
bert may not have known.  Of all of the Bernstein relatives sent to the east, only Erna survived.
162. See Chatel & Ferree, supra note 160.
163. Id.
164. Concentration Camp Memorial Neuengamme, supra note 160.
165. See Chatel & Ferree, supra note 160.
166. Id.
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and surrounding areas.167  In one of those ironic reversals of racial
stereotyping and prejudice, the leader of the street cleaning depart-
ment (Aufräumamt) explained to the investigators from the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey, that once they became available to
him, he liked to use half-Jews as foremen to supervise this work “be-
cause of their higher intelligence.”168
Gerhard Bernstein survived the war and the camp and eventually
returned, for a time, to his family in Hamburg.  How much he had
been damaged psychologically and physically is impossible to deter-
mine.  Pressure from the Nazis had not been enough to convince his
wife to abandon and divorce him before the war, but their marriage
did not last long after it.  He died in Hamburg at the relatively young
age of 62.
Unlike his relatives, Gerhard Bernstein was interned in the
Reich, not sent to one of the camps in the east, because, unlike them,
he had married a German before the rules that limited such marriages
had come into effect.  Persons like him with one or two “fully Jewish
grandparents” “in the racial sense” were considered “Jewish
Mischling.”169  The Mischlinge occupied a kind of twilight zone in the
racial categorizations introduced by the Nazis.  They retained their
civic status as Germans, but only weakly.
The classification of a Mischling changed if he voluntarily associ-
ated himself with the Jewish community.  Such a person was reclassi-
fied as a “Geltungsjude,” or a “deemed” Jew.  A person deemed to
be a Jew was treated as a Jew for the purposes of each of the dis-
criminatory statutes and orders issued by the Nazis.  Two of
Gerhard’s siblings, his sister Erna and his youngest brother Herbert,
had associated themselves with the Jewish community by marrying
Jews, and thus had been deemed Jews.  Herbert’s uncle Herbert had
managed to get out of Germany and emigrate to the United States,
while such emigration was still possible.  Erna and her husband did
not get out in time.
Their different respective classifications as Mischling and
deemed Jew gave these two siblings, Gerhard and Erna Bernstein,
different statuses under German law.  As a Mischling, Gerhard re-
tained his German citizenship.  Erna, a Geltungsjude, did not.  Erna
167. Id.  It appears that those who were used after the catastrophic raids in July and August,
1943 were all prisoners of war. Beginning in 1944, “Halbjuden” and German prisoners were also
employed in this work.  HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 61.
168. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 61.
169. Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4, at 16.
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was subject to deportation to the east. Gerhard, for the time being at
least, was not.  In a State as profoundly lawless as Nazi Germany,
there was every reason to believe that the rules might change.  In a
state as profoundly lawless as Nazi Germany, there was some protec-
tion for those who retained their citizenship until the rules did
change, but as the conditions in Neuengamme gave eloquent testi-
mony, not much.
KLEINALARM, FLIEGERALARM AND HOCHBUNKERS
There were more than one hundred and twenty-five Allied at-
tacks on Hamburg from the air between the beginning of the war and
the evening of July 24, 1943.  “The raids extended from nuisance at-
tacks to keep the population jittery, to ‘heavy bombings.’”170  The
government developed an elaborate system of air raid warnings to
enable the population to take shelter before the bombs began to fall.
Observer stations far from Hamburg picked up evidence of enemy
aircraft and began tracking them.  Once it appeared that they might
be heading toward Hamburg, various emergency personnel in the city
were contacted and told to prepare for an attack. When the threat
seemed likely to be directed at Hamburg, a Kleinalarm171 sounded
from the sirens situated through the city, putting the public on notice
that it should prepare to take cover.  This alarm was merely a warn-
ing, and intended to put the population on a heightened state of alert.
It did not, however, require any specific action.  These alarms would
have been a fact of life for Herbert from the time he was eleven until
he was thirteen.  Over the course of the entire war, such alarms
sounded in Hamburg on average once every two or three days.172
Most of the time, they proved to be  “false alarms.”173  The planes
changed course or flew past Hamburg on their way to bomb Kiel or
Lübeck or some other place.  If the number of planes was large and
170. CAIDIN, supra note 12, at 23.  The last heavy raid prior to July 1943 was in July 1942.
Calculations of the number of attacks vary from 127 to 137.  They resulted in the deaths of 1,194
persons.  See Hamburg im Krieg [Hamburg during the War], supra note 113.
171. The term means small alarm. It was also referred to as a “Vorwarnung” or early warn-
ing.  HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 7-10.
172. Between the first attack in May, 1940 and the surrender of the city in May, 1945, the
Hamburg civil defense authorities ordered the sounding of seven hundred and seventy-eight
warnings or “Kleinalarm”, and seven hundred and eight “Fliegeralarm.”  See Flakschutz für
Hamburg im 2. Welkrieg [Anti-Aircraft Defense for Hamburg in the Second World War], at
http://www.bunkerforschung.de/flakhamburg (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
173. In about 70% of the cases in which an alarm was sounded, there was not an actual at-
tack on the city.  See id.
1HAAGAN_FMT 09/10/03  4:12 PM
42 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 13:7
closing in on Hamburg, the warning changed to a Fliegeralarm - fif-
teen rapid, four-second wails of the sirens.  This alarm required eve-
ryone to take shelter, and the rules were enforced by block wardens
and police.  Regulations issued from Berlin mandated that this alarm
not sound until the attacking planes were only ten minutes or sixty
miles away from the city.  Major General Alwin Wolz, the person re-
sponsible for the air raid warning system in Hamburg, soon reached
the conclusion that those regulations were unrealistic.  They did not
give the public enough time to get out of their homes and into the
shelters.  As a result, he exercised a discretion that had not been
given to him to sound the alarm when the planes were still twenty
minutes away.174
The Nazis had started serious preparations to defend against air
attack in 1935, and from 1937 all new buildings were required to have
air raid shelters.175  There was, in addition, a major program to build
shelters to protect those living in older buildings.  These efforts were
not sufficient, however, to meet the entire needs of this rapidly
growing city.  Whatever the regulations might require, there were not
enough shelters to accommodate everyone.  How many could be ac-
commodated is a matter of some dispute.  The answer depends in part
on assumptions about how many more people actually crowded into
the shelters than they were supposed to hold, and on definitions of
what constituted a shelter.176  People took refuge in all sorts of places
ranging from simple cellars in private homes, to spaces in basements
of public buildings, to a variety of specially built air raid shelters.
These specially constructed shelters were also of many different
types. Some were underground shelters.  Some were small above
ground structures that looked like pillboxes.  The most prized were
massive above ground structures, known as Hochbunkers, many of
which can still be seen in Hamburg today.177
174. See HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 7-10. The American report incorrectly
spells his name “Woltz.”  Wolz would later defy Berlin again, and save Hamburg needless suf-
fering, by surrendering the city to the British in violation of specific orders that he defend it.
Hamburg im Krieg, supra note 113.  Fliegeralarm translates into English as “air-raid warning.”
175. Id.
176. According to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Report the shelters in the
city were able to shelter a third of the population at their rated capacities, but they were often
crowded well above those ratings and may have sheltered closer to sixty per cent.  HAMBURG
FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 138-39.  It is not clear what those unable to crowd in did when
one of the mandatory Fliegeralarm sounded.
177. The Hamburg Museum gives the number of Hochbunkers as 108, and calculates that
they were capable of sheltering about 10% of the population of the city.  Hamburg im Krieg,
supra note 113. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey counted, depending on definition,
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It might seem obvious that the safest place to be in the face of
the onslaught of allied bombers would have been underground.  What
Herbert learned was that the obvious was not necessarily right.  In the
air attacks on Hamburg, the greatest danger, and by far the largest
number of deaths, was not from explosions, but fire. In these fires, air
was sucked out of the underground bunkers suffocating those shelter
seekers who survived the initial blast.  The Hochbunkers, above
ground, thick walled, heavily reinforced structures, on the other hand,
proved relatively impervious both to the destruction that rained from
the skies, and the conflagrations that followed.178  It was Herbert’s re-
sponsibility to work out the quickest route to the Hochbunker nearest
to whatever apartment or remnant of an apartment he and his family
were living in at the time, so that they could get there in time and
would not be forced into one of the subterranean facilities by the po-
lice and block wardens.  The Bernsteins, like most of the residents of
the city, kept a packed case by the door to take with them to the bun-
ker, so that they could there quickly, and so that they would have
something in the event that the bombs struck their home.
The Hochbunkers proved an adequate protection for Herbert
and his mother against the immediate loss of life and limb.  But after
they emerged from each successive bombing raid, there was less and
less of a city to return to.  The pace of bombing raids may have de-
creased after 1940, but the raids that occurred had a quite literal im-
pact on the lives of the Bernsteins.  The apartment that Herbert
shared with his mother was destroyed in one of the early bombing
raids, and the two of them were forced to find someone, who still had
an apartment, to move in with.  Then that apartment was destroyed in
another raid, and both families had to find other friends with intact
apartments.  It was becoming an increasingly difficult task with each
successive raid.  As Herbert recalled the experience, their friends and
neighbors were amazingly generous about taking them in.  The re-
peated bombings did not cause the citizens of Hamburg to turn on
each other.  Herbert could not recall instances of apartments being
between seven and twenty-three more than that.  HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at
138-39.
178. In fact, they have proven difficult to remove in peacetime.  For an account of the elabo-
rate efforts of the demolition firm Georg Werner GmbH to destroy a World War II Hochbun-
ker in Hamburg, see generally Spreng-und abbruchunternehmen, George Werner GMBH at
http://www.b-i-m.de/Berichte/B06/B06z0697.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2003).  That particular air
raid shelter was approximately sixty feet high. The walls and roof were made of steel reinforced
concrete. The roof was more than four and half feet thick and the walls were more than three
and a half feet thick.
1HAAGAN_FMT 09/10/03  4:12 PM
44 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 13:7
robbed during the raids, or even of anyone talking about the possibil-
ity.
Part of the answer to this one happy element in an otherwise
seemingly unrelentingly depressing picture of life in Hamburg during
the war is the obvious one.  Nazi Germany was a police state.  The
authorities assumed the power to place people who needed shelter in
the homes and apartments of those whom they determined to have
extra space.  It would have been an act of enlightened self-interest for
the people of Hamburg to take in persons that they knew and liked,
rather than wait to have someone unknown thrust on them.  In addi-
tion, the authorities imposed elaborate regulatory schemes that made
looting in the wake of the raids substantially more difficult.  If some-
one salvaged property—moveable goods, food, or building materi-
als—from a damaged building, that person was not permitted to take
it away, even it belonged to him.  He was permitted only to bring it
out into the streets or to a nearby open area.  The property was then
transported to one of twenty-two depots set up around the city by the
social welfare department, where it was catalogued.  Only then was it
turned over to a person who claimed it and could prove that it be-
longed to him.  The process, which was bureaucratic and cumber-
some, was supposed to limit looting. Apparently it did.179
The Report of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey sug-
gests that there was another reason as well.  The German national
government had created an insurance scheme to compensate victims
of enemy attacks for personal and property damage that they suf-
fered, and for the profits that they lost.180  The compensation program
was initially created by a decree dated November 10, 1940.  Addi-
tional decrees added various refinements over the course of the war,
but the basic structure remained intact.  Surprisingly, the system
seems to have functioned effectively until close to the end of the war,
even in the wake of the most devastating attacks.  The bulk of claims
submitted following the firestorms in Hamburg caused by the
July/August 1943 attacks, which lead to the evacuation of half of the
population, were reportedly cleared within sixty days.  Those submit-
ted after the several hundred smaller raids were processed substan-
tially more quickly.181
179. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 138-39.
180. Id. at 64-66, 74-79.
181. Id. at 76.
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The physical injury and disability part of the compensation sys-
tem was based on a government-sponsored, compulsory insurance
system, under the terms of which all employed persons had a percent-
age of their pay deducted.  It was administered at the lowest level by
the existing office for the care of widows and orphans, but was backed
up by national welfare office under the authority of the labor minis-
try.182  A German183 who was injured as the result of enemy action was
entitled to payment for his medical care, and, if disabled from work-
ing, to a pension as well.  Persons who had not paid into the plan, be-
cause they were not working, were treated the same as if they had.184
Those with injuries to property made their claims to different
authorities, depending on whether their losses were more or less than
100,000 RM.  A person who claimed damage to household goods was
entitled to an immediate payment of 500 RM, and given an opportu-
nity to prove actual losses if they were higher, and a streamlined pro-
cedure was set up for the settlement of such claims.185
The compensation scheme did not attempt to cover all losses.
There were strict limits placed on the amounts paid to persons who
could no longer work.186  Business losses, which were handled by a dif-
ferent authority-were subject to substantially greater restrictions.187
Those whose businesses had been destroyed and could not be re-
paired were compensated only if they intended to start a new business
that was deemed to be desirable for the economy.  Ship owners were
not compensated until after they had actually made the expenditures
to replace their ships.188  But if the compensation system did not cover
all loses, it did provide a significant level of risk spreading, and meant
that those most immediately affected by the bombing were not ren-
dered totally destitute. It may have been an important factor in help-
ing to maintain a measure of social peace under exceptionally difficult
circumstances.189
182. Id. at 74-75.
183. A non-German could under special circumstances make a claim under the system, but
had first to get the permission of the Ministry of the Interior.  Id. at 76.
184. Id. at 75.
185. Id. at 77
186. Id. at 75-76.
187. Total compensation paid out under the business insurance scheme was only about 10%
of total estimated losses.  Payments by the Hamburg office totalled 2,380,256,924 RM on esti-
mated total damages in Hamburg of 23,050,000,000 RM.  Id. at 78-79.
188. Id. at 78
189. Before I began this paper, it had always struck me as curious that someone who had
been through the sorts of experience that Herbert Bernstein had been through would choose to
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DIE KATASTROPHE
Sir Arthur Harris is supposed to have looked out on the fires
burning in London after one of the German attacks on that city dur-
ing the Battle of Britain and said: “Well, they are sowing the wind.”190
When he took over Bomber Command in February 1942, he began
putting into place a plan that would insure that the people of Ham-
burg would reap what the Luftwaffe had sown.  The attack that he
planned, and put into execution in late July and early August, pro-
duced more destruction and greater loss of life than any previous air
attack in history.191  The level and intensity of the destruction are dif-
ficult to comprehend.192  Once again, things were to happen to Her-
bert, because of an identity attributed to him, and over which he had
no control.  He was an enemy of the British Empire, and the wrath of
that Empire, quite literally, came crashing down on his head.193
start his career studying insurance law.  It seemed to me that in the wake of the social catastro-
phes that he had witnessed, insurance would seem like a vaguely pathetic response.  In fact, his
experiences may have led him to the opposite conclusion.  The insurance system as it operated
in Hamburg may have been essential to preventing a terrible situation from devolving into com-
plete social chaos.  Then again, it may have had nothing to do with his later decision.  Hamburg
has an important insurance industry, and Herbert may well only have been looking forward to
career opportunities.
190. CAIDIN, supra note 12, at 7.
191. There are numerous studies of the attacks, known as Die Katastrophe in Hamburg, and
code-named Operation Gomorrah by British Bomber Command.  See, e.g., GORDON
MUSGROVE, OPERATION GOMORRAH, THE HAMBURG FIRESTORM RAIDS 162 (1981) (con-
centrating on technical matters surrounding the operation and the firestorm); CAIDIN, supra
note 12 (providing a British perspective on the human consequences of the attacks);
MIDDLEBROOK, supra note 139 (describing the operation of these attacks in an easily accessi-
ble, readable manner).
192. President Roosevelt established the United States Strategic Bombing Survey on No-
vember 3, 1944 in hopes of better understanding the effect of strategic bombing, and of the mili-
tary and civil defenses to it.  The survey done of Hamburg has a repetitively chilling quality to it.
The investigators found that the defenses of the city were well organized, and the personnel well
trained.  The warning systems were well conceived, and the emergency services well organized
and well staffed.  The Report found that, in general, each of the relevant services had responded
effectively to Allied air attacks.  At the end of each of the sections, there is then a qualification -
except in July/August, 1943.  In the raids that took place during the ten days between July 24
and August 3, 1943, the organization, training, and planning of each of the emergency services
were overwhelmed.  The unstated conclusion of the report was clear.  An attack of such propor-
tions could not be prepared for and would, if it came, result in terrible destruction.  HAMBURG
FIELD REPORT, supra note 12.
193. None of the account of Operation Gomorrah comes directly from Herbert.  Although I
asked him about it several times, he always deflected the discussion in another direction.  He
treated me to several learned monologues on the law related to the bombing of civilians, but,
while he was willing to talk with me about his experiences of the smaller raids, he never talked
to me about those ten days.
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The first attack began shortly before midnight on July 24, 1943.
By the time it finished two and one half-hours later, in the early
morning hours of July 25, seven hundred and forty planes had
dropped 2,396 tons of bombs and incendiary devices.194  The bombs
shattered windows, blew in doors, and insured that fire crews had to
remain in the shelters.  The incendiaries then set the exposed build-
ings on fire.195  It proved a remarkably effective tactic.  At one point
that night, fifty-one miles of building frontage were burning.196
Twelve hours after the bombers flew back to their bases in England, a
second smaller attack sent the dazed inhabitants of Hamburg scram-
bling back into their shelters.  After two days of respite, a second
major attack began at twenty minutes before midnight on July 27.
This time seven hundred and thirty-nine planes dropped 2,417 tons of
bombs and incendiaries on the city.197  At one point, there were an es-
timated 7,000 buildings, 129 miles of building frontage, on fire.198  Af-
ter just one night of respite, there was a third major attack on July 29,
with 726 planes dropping 2,382 tons of explosives and incendiaries on
the city.199  The third major attack set 98 miles of building frontage on
fire.200  The raids continued through August 3.  Over the course of the
ten days, more than a hundred thousand bombs, and three million in-
cendiary devices fell on Hamburg, reducing 6,000 acres to ash and
ruin.201  The devastation was so complete that the later attacks began
to run into the law of diminishing returns.  In many parts of the city,
they failed to produce any new fires, because there was nothing left to
burn.202
The worst of the attacks, that of July 27-28, produced a new phe-
nomenon, a thermal firestorm of almost unimaginable horror.  On
what had been a hot, still evening, the firestorm created powerful
winds that caused many little fires to become a single huge conflagra-
tion, which in turn caused those winds rushing in to feed the fire to
reach hurricane force.203  The winds tore trees apart and made it im-
194. CAIDIN, supra note 12, at 63-64.
195. MUSGROVE, supra note 191, at 109.
196. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 31.
197. CAIDIN, supra note 12, at 63-64.
198. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 31.
199. CAIDIN, supra note 12, at 63-64.
200. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 31.
201. CAIDIN, supra note 12, at 9.
202. MUSGROVE, supra note 191, at 146.
203. Id. at 110.
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possible for fire crews to get near the fire.204  Temperatures reached
1,400 degrees Fahrenheit, reducing the bricks in some of the shelters,
where the inhabitants of Hamburg had attempted to take refuge, to
ash.205  Burning gases were carried up almost three miles into the night
sky,206 and the fire produced a smoke cloud that eventually rose to
30,000 feet.207  A member of one of the Allied bomber crews reported
that he could see Hamburg burning from 90 miles away.208
This extraordinary and unprecedented phenomenon would be-
come the subject of many scientific studies.209  On the night of July 27
and 28, it was an incomprehensible devastation.  The Hamburg
authorities officially designated the fire area a “Dead Zone.”  The
authorities estimated that 31,000 people had been killed, but it was
impossible to know with any certainty.210  Many bodies had been re-
duced to ashes, and much of the area was so hot that no one could go
into it for days.211  When rescue crews finally went in and opened the
doors of bomb shelters looking for survivors or bodies, the rush of
oxygen into these still superheated spaces caused whatever was
flammable in there, including the bodies, to burst into flame.
Herbert and his mother fortunately were not in the Dead Zone.
Their Hochbunker was one of the ones that did survive the bomb-
ing.212  But when they emerged after the all clear, they discovered that
they had no home to return to.  He and his mother had survived, but
most of his native city had not.  Herbert Bernstein was thirteen and a
half years old.
In the wake of the devastation visited by Operation Gomorrah,
the Gauleiter for Hamburg, Karl Kaufmann, repeatedly requested
that Hitler come to the city to raise the spirits of the people.213  When
204. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 32.
205. CAIDIN, supra note 12, at 93.
206. Id.
207. MUSGROVE, supra note 191, at 109.
208. CAIDIN, supra note 12, at 93.
209. MUSGROVE, supra note 191, at 102.
210. Id. at 115-16, 166. Some of the authorities actually thought that the number was much
higher than that.  The Fire Department told the United States Strategic Bombing Survey inves-
tigators that they believed that 55,000 had died and that they had recovered 45,000 bodies.
HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 32.  The Hamburg Museum now estimates that the
total number of deaths was 35,000, significantly less than that thought at the time.  Hamburg im
Krieg, supra note 113.
211. MUSGROVE, supra note 191, at 102.
212. Other structures did not perform as well.  Two thirds of those who had taken shelter in
the “splinter proof shelter” on Eichenstrasse died in it.  Id. at xxix.
213. KERSHAW, NEMESIS, supra note 109, at 598.  Albert Speer also added his voice to that
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Hitler would not come to Hamburg, Kaufmann organized a delega-
tion of emergency services workers who had done particularly meri-
torious service during the attacks, and sent them to Berlin to see the
Führer.  Hitler refused to meet with them.214  Joseph Goebbels, noting
that Hitler had not spoken to the public in more than three months,
pleaded with him to address the German people by radio “even for
only a quarter of an hour.”215  Hitler stated that the situation was “as
unsuitable as could be imagined,” and refused to do it.216  Instead,
Hermann Göring was convinced to go into Hamburg.  He arrived on
August 6, but left the same day.217  Göring told his aides that he found
the experience depressing, and that he wanted to get away from
Hamburg.218
LIVING IN A PIG STY
Before the raids, Hamburg had 122,323 houses and 450,000
apartments, most of which were contained in large buildings to the
east of the River Alster.  After the attacks, a third of the houses and
fifty-six percent of the apartments were either completely destroyed
or damaged beyond repair.219  It no longer made sense to move in with
someone whose house or apartment had not been destroyed.  There
were not enough houses or apartments left.  The only water supply in
the city came from water carts.  There was no tap water, and would
not be any for three weeks.  Even then, there were so many breaks in
the water mains that pressure could not be maintained to raise the
water above street level.  Not until November was water service re-
stored.220  There was no electricity and no gas in the city.  The sewer
system was badly damaged and trash was not picked up for weeks.221
Like Göring, most people wanted to leave Hamburg, but because
they found the prospect of staying to be terrifying, not depressing.222
However, leaving was not so easy for them.  The roads were filled
with rubble and many were impassible to vehicles.  Public transporta-
of Gauleiter Kaufmann, with similar lack of effect.  MIDDLEBROOK, supra note 139, at 357-58.
214. KERSHAW, NEMESIS, supra note 109, at 598.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. MIDDLEBROOK, supra note 139, at 357.
218. Id. at 358.
219. MUSGROVE, supra note 191, at 162.
220. Id. at 162-63.
221. Id. at 164.
222. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 157.
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tion had all but ceased, and what remained was not allowed to cross
the part of the city designated a “Dead Zone.”  Rail stations and
tracks were destroyed, along with a quarter of the rolling stock of the
U-bahn.223  Some people gathered in parks and race tracks to await
such transportation as the authorities could organize.  Others decided
not to wait for anyone, and took every conceivable form of transpor-
tation, or simply walked, in an effort to get away from the city.  The
surrounding communities were soon overrun with these refugees, as
were the camps hastily set up to receive them.  Late arrivals were
forced to push further into the countryside away from Hamburg.224
In the chaos, governmental controls designed to keep track of
who was going where broke down, so there is no entirely satisfactory
estimate of the total number of refugees.225  The situation was further
complicated by the fact that some people started to try to move back
into the city, while others were still trying to get out.  What is certain
is the scale of the exodus.  In the days following the final raid on
August 2 and 3 1943, between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people, about
half the population of this second largest city in the Reich, left their
homes to seek shelter somewhere else.226  Only those associated with
strategic industries or the government remained in the city.  Those
able to go to friends and relatives did so.  Those unable to find such
places to go were relocated, some to the countryside around the city,
others deep into the interior of the Reich.227
Many of those who fled the bombing tried to return, once they
had discovered what was available to them outside of Hamburg.  The
authorities, struggling to make Hamburg functional again, did what
they could do to prevent them from doing so.  Initially, the return of
women and children was banned, and later all schools in the city were
ordered to be shut down in an effort to discourage their return.
These efforts were only partially successful.  About fifteen percent of
those who had fled returned to the city by the end of August.228  Most
of the rest, like Herbert and his mother, did not return until late 1944,
or until after the war.
223. MUSGROVE, supra note 191, at 164.
224. Id. at 162-65; HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 157-58.
225. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 158.
226. The number who fled constituted about two thirds of the civilian population. E.g.,
MIDDLEBROOK, supra note 139, at 358; HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 157.
227. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 157-58.  Those evacuated to nearby areas
were well received by the local population, but those sent to Bavaria frequently encountered
hostility.  MIDDLEBROOK, supra note 139, at 358.
228. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 158.
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Fortunately, Herbert and his mother knew a family that had a
farm relatively near to the city.  That family had no room in their
house or their barn, which had long since been taken over by other
homeless families.  They did, however, have a pig sty.  The Bern-
steins, mother and son, gratefully accepted the offer.  For those who
did not live through that time in Germany, this offer conjures up im-
ages of Bruegel-like chaos, with animals and people living together in
some sort of riot of life.  The reality was far less colorful.  With the
shortages attendant on the war, the pigs had been gone for years.
What was left was a cold, unheated, spare space that provided little
privacy, but offered shelter from the North German winter.  It was
not much, but it was better than the alternatives.
The Bernsteins remained on the farm, in the pig sty, through at
the least the spring of 1944.229  Somehow, in ways that I have never
understood, Herbert managed to continue his education.  He was for-
tunate that after the authorities closed the schools in the center of the
city, they relocated them out the fringes and reopened them in Octo-
ber, 1943.230  One of these schools was apparently close enough to the
farm for Herbert to get to it.  It might seem, nonetheless, that even if
one could manage to get to a school that was not bombed out or
closed by the authorities and find a teacher who had not been con-
scripted or interned, that it would have been next to impossible, un-
der the circumstances, to motivate oneself to study the Latin texts
that were such a significant part of the curriculum.  Herbert told me
that for him the disruption had the opposite effect.  He said there was
something comforting about things that seemed timeless in a time of
such impermanence, things that were part of a common Western tra-
dition at the time when the West was literally tearing itself apart.
Herbert was not, of course, left alone to study Latin, even in the
pig sty.  While he was there, he turned fourteen, and the Nazis had
other plans for him.
JOINING THE HITLER YOUTH
When he turned 14, Herbert was required, along with all other
German boys of his age to join the Hitler Youth, and became Hitler-
junge Bernstein.  Herbert, on more than one occasion, noted the
229. See Neil Vidmar, Remarks at the Memorial Service for Herbert Bernstein, April 25,
2001, http://law.duke.edu/fac/bernstein/vidmar.html (placing Herbert Bernstein at the farm on
Hitler’s Birthday in 1944).
230. HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 158.
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irony of this title.  The elaborate racial categorizations of the Nazis
that had led them to deport and then murder many of his relatives,
and arrest and intern his father in a concentration camp, caused them
to mandate that he do his “honorary service for the German people.”
Had the racial lines been drawn in a different place, he noted, he too
might have been sent to the east, rather than sent off in his Nazi uni-
form to prepare for service to the Reich.  Herbert detested the asso-
ciation of his name with Hitler’s.  He was quite sure that, if Hitler had
known, he too would have been deeply offended to have his name as-
sociated with Herbert’s.
If the symbolism of participation in the Hitler Youth was jarring
and distressing, his actual participation ended up being a fairly pedes-
trian experience.  Herbert, once again, was forced to participate in a
regimen of physical exercise and gymnastic training, in which once
again he distinguished himself by his lack of aptitude.  Since part of
the purpose of the Hitler Youth experience was to train young Ger-
man boys for their future roles in the defense of the Fatherland, he
also had to learn a variety of military skills, such as map reading.  It
turned out that he was as good at map reading as he was bad at gym-
nastics.  He was so good, in fact, that he was selected to receive the
award in map reading at a ceremony honoring those in the Hitler
Youth who had achieved special distinction.  The event presented a
rare opportunity for his mother to bask in the reflected glory of her
son’s achievement.  When the day came, it was not to be.  The Party
official, who had been brought in to give an inspirational speech and
hand out the awards, discovered to his horror the intolerable juxtapo-
sition of a Jewish name next to a Hitler Youth achievement award.  In
the middle of the ceremony, he demanded that the map-reading
award be given to someone more suitable.  Herbert was German
enough to be able to do “honorary service for the German people,”
but not German enough to receive an award for excellence in map
reading.  Protection of German Blood and German Honor required
constant vigilance and individual initiative.
The discrimination suffered by Herbert at the Hitler Youth
award ceremony was probably the product of the pettiness of a par-
ticular Party official, rather than official policy.  There was nothing in
the regulations that required it.  It mirrored, however, the sorts of dis-
tinctions that the Nazis applied to adults in the military, as they tried
to work out the logic of their racist policies against the backdrop of
wartime needs.  In 1934, the Nazis had forced Jews out of the military
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in an extension of their program of Aryanizing the civil service.231  The
following year, they reintroduced conscription in March 1935,232 and,
as they would later with the Hitler Youth, subjected Mischlinge to
it.233  The Mischlinge were not initially permitted to be promoted to
higher rank.234  But the problems of racial categorization, and the dif-
ficulties of adapting it to those who did not easily fit into one or an-
other grouping, led to further elaboration of these rules in 1940.
Recognizing the usefulness of at least some Mischlinge, the Nazis
changed the rules to permit those with one only one fully Jewish
grandparent to be promoted “in exceptional circumstances.”  Those
with two fully Jewish grandparents, on the other hand, were not to be
used, no matter how exceptional the circumstances. They were dis-
charged from the armed forces.235
Herbert never had to deal personally with the working out of ra-
cial categories in the context of service in the military.  He was too
young to be conscripted into the Wehrmacht.  He was not, however,
too young to avoid being conscripted into the Volkssturm, or peoples’
militia.  This organization probably originated as the idea of Martin
Bormann.236  It was in equal parts the product of the increasingly des-
perate military situation of the Third Reich, and an important expres-
sion of Nazi ideology.237  In August, September and October 1944, the
Wehrmacht suffered casualties of 1,189,000.238  There were virtually
no reserves of manpower available to replace those losses.  More than
twenty per cent of the German workforce, by this point, consisted of
231. Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4, at 8. Those “not of Aryan descent” included all
persons with at least one Jewish grandparent. See First Regulation, supra note 71, v.11.4.1933
(RGB1.I S. 195) available at http://www.salvator.net/salmat/pw/pw1/macht/beamte.htm.  Certain
exceptions were made for, among others, persons who had served at the front during the First
World War.  Id.
232. Wehrgesetz [Military Law], v.21.5.1935, (RGB1.I S. 609).  For an account of the rein-
troduction of military conscription, see KERSHAW, HUBRIS, supra note 1, at 550-52.
233. Bernstein, Reflections, supra note 4, at 18.
234. Wehrgesetz, supra note 232, §15-3, (explaining that “Arische Abstammung” [Aryan
descent], precluded those not of Aryan descent from becoming “superiors”).
235. Id.
236. Alastair Noble, The People’s Levy: The Volkssturm and Popular Mobilization in East-
ern Germany, 1944-45, 24 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 165 (2001);  see also 11 THE TRIAL OF GERMAN
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 597-598, available at http://nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-11-100-
07.shmtl (presenting testimony of Dr. Bergold (counsel for Bormann) concerning the
Volkssturm, Nuremberg , April 5, 1946, at 58).
237. Daniel K. Yelton, “Ein Volk Steht Auf”: The German Volkssturm and Nazi Strategy,
1944-45, J. MIL. HIST. (Oct. 2000), at 1061, 1063-64.
238. KERSHAW, NEMESIS, supra note 109, at 713.
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foreign conscript labor.239  Whatever replacements were going to be
found would have to come from the old and the young.  No one else
was left.240  But if born of desperation, the Volkssturm also repre-
sented a symbolic statement for the Nazi ideologues of the unity of
the German people in the face of the enemy, of the “Party’s belief in
the ‘triumph of the will,’” the overcoming of overwhelming obstacles
through “sheer willpower.”241
Hitler created the Volkssturm by decree on September 25, 1944,
subjecting all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty and capable
of bearing arms to service in it.242  The Volkssturm was then formally
launched by Heinrich Himmler on October 18, 1944, the 131st anni-
versary of the defeat of Napoleon at the “Battle of the Peoples” and
the liberation of German territory.243  Ill-equipped and worse trained,
the Volkssturm proved to be largely ineffective as a fighting force.244
In the absence of alternatives, the Nazis continued nonetheless to call
up more and more of younger and younger German boys. In Febru-
ary or March 1945, fifteen-year-old Herbert received notice that he
had been conscripted into the Volkssturm as part of the preparations
for the final defense of the Reich.  It is remarkable in the chaos dur-
ing the weeks before the final collapse of the Nazi regime that the
government still functioned well enough to find him and get him the
notice.
The usual procedure was to work through the existing structure
of the Hitler Youth, and to conscript the members of each of the units
together.  If the conscript failed to show up at the appointed time, ei-
ther by sending word that he was ill, or by simply not appearing, the
authorities frequently were not up to the task of tracking down the
shirkers.245  Apparently something of the sort happened with Herbert,
and Hitlerjunge Bernstein avoided becoming Volkssturmer Bern-
stein.  He successfully ignored the summons until it was too late to
239. Id.
240. No one else was left except the 187,000 men who were commandeered by Goebbels in
1944 to act as extras in the film Kohlberg, an epic depicting the defense of a Baltic town against
Napoleon.  Id. at 713.
241. Id. at 713.
242. The decree is available in translation in IV JEREMY NOAKES, NAZISM: THE GERMAN
HOMEFRONT IN WORLD WAR II 643-644 (1998).
243. KERSHAW, NEMESIS, supra note 109, at 713.
244. See Order of the Fuehrer on Employment of the Volkssturm, January 28, 1945, available
at http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/1084/fuehrer_directives.htm.
245. Interview with Dr. Bernd Michaels (recalling his personal experiences and recollections
regarding the procedure of conscription into the Volkssturm during the war).
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participate in the inaptly named Endsieg, or final victory.  Possibly for
the first time in his life, he successfully avoided being forced to as-
sume an identity that someone else wanted to thrust on him.
DAS HUNGERWINTER
The end of the war ended the threat of conscription and brought
the release of his father from Neuengamme, but it hardly ended the
hardships of his early life. Hamburg was one of the most heavily
bombed of all German cities.  By May 1945, half of its housing stock
had been completely destroyed and only twenty per cent was undam-
aged.246  The apartment where Herbert and his mother lived had
some, but not all, of its exterior walls.  Through all the bombings, the
municipal authorities in Hamburg had done a heroic job of feeding,
after a fashion, their population.  The invading and later occupying
British forces were not as motivated or equipped to take up the chal-
lenge.  To make matters worse, the first winter after the war was un-
usually severe.247  The result was that those who had lived through the
horrors of war in Hamburg remembered the first year after it as one
of unusual hardship.248
Recovery and reconstruction were complicated by a sharp in-
crease in the population of the city at the end of the war.  Between
May 1945 and December 1947, the population of Hamburg grew by
500,000 as refugees from the east, former Hamburg residents who had
fled into the countryside, former soldiers, and groups of homeless
persons poured into the shattered city.249  This influx dramatically
worsened an already severe housing shortage.250  As late as 1948,
246. Die moderne Metropole [The Modern Metropolis], Museum für Hamburgische
Geschichte [Hamburg Museum], at  http://www.hamburgmuseum.de/d/htm_d/textversion/20jhd-
2-03.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
247. Hungerwinter [Winter of Hunger], Museum für Hamburgische Geschichte [Hamburg
Museum], at http://www.hamburgmuseum.de/d/htm_d/textversion/20jhd-2-01.html (last visited
Oct. 4, 2002).
248. Id.
249. According to the Report of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, the popula-
tion of Hamburg at the beginning of the war was 1.7 million.  In the wake of operation Gomor-
rah, it fell to approximately 800,000.  Between August, 1943 and May, 1945, as many of those,
like Herbert and his mother, who had fled returned to the city, the population grew again to ap-
proximately 1.1 million.  HAMBURG FIELD REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.  On the increase in
population between May, 1945 and the end of 1947, see, Hungerwinter, supra note 247.
250. The housing shortage was then further worsened by the seizure of housing units, and
the expulsion of their 40,000 tenants, for use by the occupying British forces.  Von der besetzten
Stadt zum Bundesland, Museum für Hamburgische Geschichte [Hamburg Museum], at
http://www.hamburgmuseum.de/d/htm_d/textversion/20jhd-2-02.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
The British occupation of Hamburg did not end until 1956.
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about an eighth of the population were living in temporary housing, a
significant percentage of them in Quonset huts made out of corru-
gated steel.251
The housing shortages were mirrored by equally severe shortages
of food and heating fuels, leading to the development of an extensive
black market.  Those who had managed to make it through the war
with goods that they could use for barter went into the surrounding
countryside to try to pry loose food from those who were hoarding
it.252  Herbert and his family had started the war with little, and ended
it with considerably less.  They, like many other residents of the city,
had little to barter with, and so resorted to stealing what they could
not buy.  To get coal to heat their accommodations through that bit-
ter winter of 1945-46, Herbert, along with many of his neighbors,
robbed the slow moving Allied supply trains as they made their way
through the city.253  Ironically their efforts were greatly aided by the
fact that the trains had to move so slowly, because Allied bombing
had heavily damaged the railbeds, which were no longer able to carry
trains at speed.254
A NEW ROAD
Two years later, Herbert Bernstein began a much happier jour-
ney than the ones he had known to date.  Having lived through all of
the chaos of the Third Reich, the war and occupation, Herbert finally
succeeded in finishing his training at the Gymnasium.  He took the
short trip north to Kiel to begin his studies in law at the Christian-
Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel.  It might be possible to make some-
thing of the symbolism of this young man, whose entire life had been
lived under lawless regimes, going to study law at an institution that
was founded in the wake of an earlier devastating religious war,255 es-
pecially at one whose institutional motto is Pax Optima Rerum -
peace is the greatest good.256  The explanation for his choice was al-
most certainly far more prosaic.  His resources and thus choices were
251. Hungerwinter, supra note 247.
252. Id.
253. This pervasive activity became so common that the people of Hamburg developed a
special term, “Kohlenklau” - coal swiping, to describe it.  See id.
254. According to Herbert, the Allied troops made little effort to interfere with him and his
neighbors as they grabbed the coal off the trains.
255. The University was founded in the wake of and partly in response to the Thirty Years
War.  Geschichte der Universität [History of the University] http://www.unikiel.de/ueberblick/
geschichtedercau.html.
256. Id. 
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very meager, and things in Hamburg were still very bad.  The Univer-
sity there had re-opened shortly after the end of the war, but condi-
tions were extremely difficult.  The University of Hamburg admitted
some 3,400 students in the winter of 1946 into an institution ill-
equipped to deal with them.257  The University had been badly dam-
aged in Operation Gomorrah, and at the end of the war, the main
buildings were still unusable.  The faculty had been drastically re-
duced in size through purges,258 retirements, and deaths; and most of
those who remained had had their books and equipment destroyed
during the war.259  The stepdaughter of the Rector of the University,
who had returned to the city as a war correspondent, was powerfully
struck by the pervasive grimness of the place.  The student body, she
noted, was a “conspicuously maimed group,” forced to eat and study
in unheated rooms, and to use up extraordinary amounts of energy
seeking out the bare means of survival.260  By her estimate, no more
than one in a hundred students had his own room to live in.261  If Her-
bert attended Kiel, he could live with his grandparents, the Franzes.
It would not be a comfortable start to his academic life.  He would
have to make do during his first year at university sleeping on a bed in
the corner of the kitchen in his grandparents’ modest home.  But then
none of the beginnings in his life had been comfortable, and the con-
ditions in Hamburg would almost certainly have been much worse.
The motto was nice and poignant, but had little to do with the deci-
sion to travel north.
The situation at the University of Hamburg apparently improved
enough during the year that Herbert spent at Kiel that he decided to
return to his native city to continue his study of law.  Things undoubt-
edly were still grim, but the Hamburg that he was returning to was
beginning to transform itself from a burned out hulk of city into the
dynamic international center that it had been and would become
257. There were approximately 7,000 applicants, many of whom reportedly tried to bribe
the Rector into admitting them.  See WOLFF-MÖNCKEBERG, supra note 8, at 165, 167.
258. The Nazi purges of the faculty were followed after the war by purges of Nazis by the
Allies.  These latter purges resulted in the dismissal of 30% of the faculty who remained at the
University of Hamburg at the end of the war.  Von der besetzten Stadt zum Bundesland [From
an Occupied Country ot the Federal Republic], supra note 250.
259. See WOLFF-MÖNCKEBERG, supra note 8, at 167.
260. Ruth Evans had been raised in Hamburg, but then married a Welshman and spent the
war in Great Britain.  What makes her comments all the more striking is the fact that her base
of comparison was the hardly luxurious conditions of post-war Welsh universities.  Id. at 168.
261. Id. Given the “harsh circumstances of daily life,” the examination results of the stu-
dents were, she noted, “astonishingly high.”
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again.262  The currency reform instituted on June 20, 1948, which in-
troduced the DM, had a dramatic and immediate impact on the econ-
omy.263  The University entered a promising phase of sustained
growth.264  Herbert had survived, if only barely, a Hamburg boyhood,
and could begin to look forward to a much more productive life as an
adult citizen of Hamburg and of the world.  The boy who had been
expelled from the gymnastics classes because he was not Aryan
enough, and who had been denied his map reading prize because of
his name, would finally get the chance to forge his own identity.
CONCLUSION
When the Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke died in 1634, his
widow uttered the wonderfully ambiguous sentiment: “We shall never
see his like again, praises be to God.”265  The undoubtedly unintended
ambiguity of her comment delighted Herbert Bernstein, and he
quoted it on more than one occasion in reference to one colleague or
another who had managed to distinguish himself in ways that were
similarly ambiguous.  I suspect that Herbert’s early experiences as a
boy in Hamburg shaped the man I knew.  I suspect that the effects of
those years on him were profound, and had much to do with the ex-
traordinary depth of decency and humanity of this unusual man.  If I
am right that his experiences were critical in shaping him, I know that
all those who knew him are the richer for what he went through.  He
was proof of human resiliency.  Given what he went through, I can
262. The University of Hamburg, despite the heroic efforts of its public relations depart-
ment to prove otherwise, was founded immediately after the First World War.  WOLFF-
MÖNCKEBERG, supra note 8, at 20.  Cf. Die Geschichte der Universität Hamburg [The History of
the University of Hamburg], University of Hamburg, at http://www.unihamburg.de/
PSV/PR/Presse/geschich.html (last modified Oct. 6, 2000).  Despite the fact that Hamburg was
not primarily an intellectual or academic center, the University quickly assembled a dynamic
and distinguished faculty, including such world renowned scholars as Erwin Panofsky (art his-
tory), William Stern (psychology), Otto Stern (physical chemistry) and Ernst Cassirer (philoso-
phy) during the Weimar Republic.  All four of them left, along with many others, when the Na-
zis came to power.  Short Introduction to the University of Hamburg, University of Hamburg, at
http://www.uni-hamburg.de/Publikat/falt_e.html (last modified May 2001).  It would take heroic
efforts after a second twentieth century war to re-establish the glory of the early interwar pe-
riod.
263. See Hungerwinter, supra note 247.
264. See Short Introduction to the University of Hamburg, supra note 262.
265. See SAMUEL E. THORNE, ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 224 (1985).  Lord Coke
was an extraordinary figure in English legal history, who, as Thorne notes, “has often been re-
garded as the protector and defender of the traditional rights of Englishmen.”  Id. at 231. In-
cluded among those “traditional” rights were ones that were entirely “his own invention.” Id.
He was also “an unpleasant, hard grasping, arrogant, and thoroughly difficult man.”  Id. at 224.
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only hope that there will never be another like him, because no one
should ever experience a Hamburg boyhood like his.
